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SMARTPHONE SECURITY FOR THE MOBILE JOURNALIST: SHOULD
REPORTERS GIVE POLICE THE FINGER?
By Frank D. LoMonte* and Philip J. Sliger**
As civil unrest flared across the United States following the
police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis, videographers and
photojournalists—both
professional
and
amateur—found
themselves targeted by police for arrests, beatings, and harassment.
Increasingly, journalists on the scene of civil unrest rely on
smartphones as their primary tool for gathering and disseminating
news. The advent of “smartphone journalism” presents an evolving
set of legal and technological questions: Under what circumstances
could a police officer compel a journalist to surrender and unlock a
smartphone, and are some security measures more durable than
others in standing up to a demand that might compromise
confidential newsgathering materials? In short, how can mobile
journalists most effectively use technology and the law to keep their
confidences secure at a time when confrontations with police are
increasingly routine and predictable? This Article attempts to
answer that question.
Courts overwhelmingly agree that the First Amendment protects
the right to record police activity in public spaces. But it is less clear
whether and under what circumstances journalists have a
constitutionally protected right to resist having their work product
searched when they are eyewitnesses to potential criminal activity,
such as looting or throwing objects at police. The first generation of
“smartphone law” cases has produced diverging results: Some (but
not all) judges regard the compelled unlocking of a secured device
*
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as implicating Fifth Amendment safeguards against selfincriminatory testimony, as well as Fourth Amendment guarantees
against unreasonable search and seizure. A little-known federal
statute, the Privacy Protection Act (“PPA”), provides an additional
potential layer of protection—or after-the-fact recourse—for a
journalist who is subjected to an intrusive search for unpublished
work. However, a recent court interpretation threatens to
undermine the reliability of PPA protection when journalists are not
just witnesses but also arrestees.
This Article surveys the landscape of constitutional and
statutory claims that might apply when a journalist is confronted
with a demand to decrypt a smartphone for police inspection.
Additionally, this Article examines the pro-and-con arguments for
the two primary security methods—alphanumeric passcodes and
biometric locks—and how courts have treated those unlocking
methods for Fourth and Fifth Amendment purposes. Lastly, this
Article concludes that journalists assigned to scenes where clashes
between police and protesters are foreseeable should anticipate
facing a demand to surrender a phone—or face an arrest—and take
precautions, knowing that after-the-fact damages as remedies
against police are, after the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in
Nieves v. Bartlett, increasingly unreliable.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
The ability to use roadways, parks, and sidewalks to demonstrate
against abusive government behavior is deeply ingrained in United
States culture and law.1 When people are angered by perceived
government overreaching, they take to the streets to dramatize their
dissatisfaction. Simmering discontent over the excessive use of
deadly force against Black people exploded into a sustained “Black
Lives Matter” protest movement when a white Minneapolis police
officer asphyxiated a 46-year-old Black man, George Floyd, during
an arrest for a petty offense in May 2020.2 In cities across the United
States and around the world, people took to the streets to protest
injustice and advocate for public policy reforms.3

1
See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940) (striking down a
statute that criminalized using public sidewalks for picketing and observing the
important role of public thoroughfares as vehicles for communicating ideas: “The
safeguarding of these means is essential to the securing of an informed and
educated public opinion with respect to a matter which is of public concern”);
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title
of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such
use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.”).
2
See Alicia Victoria Lozano, Fury Across U.S. as Protesters Demand Justice
for George Floyd’s Death, NBCNEWS (May 30, 2020, 12:11 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/curfew-set-twin-cities-after-unrestturns-chaos-during-48-n1218991 [https://perma.cc/CNW7-WKWZ] (reporting
that public outrage over Minneapolis police killing of George Floyd, an unarmed
Black man, spawned civil unrest in cities throughout the United States, and even
abroad).
3
Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be
the Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protestscrowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/S5N8-6GG6].
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One distinct feature of the recent protest movements is the
massive amount of contemporaneous footage that both professional
and amateur videographers are sharing online. A civilian with a
smartphone captured George Floyd’s killing in its entirety,4 and the
subsequent protests and unrest that reverberated across the country
were documented by thousands of spectators, often by the
participants themselves.5 Demonstrations of peaceful protest, as
well as acts of violence, are now streamed live to viewers at home.
Amateur coverage of the events can reach the public hours before
mainstream media outlets repackage the content for their audiences.
At times, these videos capture lawbreaking activity, such as
excessive force by police or vandalism by civilians.6 Thus,
“smartphone journalists” regularly capture footage that could be
used as evidence in criminal investigations.7
The scenario of a smartphone journalist capturing documentary
evidence of criminal activity will likely become more commonplace
as participation in social movements increases, both on social media

4
See Rachel Treisman, Darnella Frazier, Teen Who Filmed Floyd’s Murder, Praised
for Making Verdict Possible, NPR (Apr. 21, 2021, 11:15 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/trial-over-killing-of-george-floyd/2021/04/21/989480867
/darnella-frazier-teen-who-filmed-floyds-murder-praised-for-making-verdict-possib
[https://perma.cc/47VN-4B67].
5
See e.g., Kellen Browning, Where Black Lives Matter Protesters Stream Live Every
Day: Twitch, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
06/18/technology/protesters-live-stream-twitch.html [https://perma.cc/TGW2-FCTQ]
(describing how protesters and “citizen journalists” created their own channels on
the video streaming platform, Twitch, dedicated to daily live feeds of people
marching in protest of police violence).
6
See Kimberly Kindy, Shayna Jacobs & David A. Fahrenthold, In Protests
Against Police Brutality, Videos Capture More Alleged Police Brutality, WASH.
POST (June 5, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/protests-policebrutality-video/2020/06/05/a9e66568-a768-11ea-b473-04905b1af82b_story.html
[https://perma.cc/E9QW-8XY4] (reporting that citizen-shot videos are capturing
police using “[b]rutal tactics” to quell unarmed protesters, raising questions about
whether officers are being properly trained and regulated).
7
See Heather Kelly & Rachel Lerman, America Is Awash in Cameras, a
Double-Edged Sword for Protesters and Police, WASH. POST (June 3, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/03/cameras-surveillancepolice-protesters/ [https://perma.cc/NU27-88RC].

218

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 23: 2

and in the offline world.8 Law enforcement has considerable interest
in obtaining such documentary materials, either to inculpate alleged
wrongdoers or to exculpate their own officers.9 Thus, the ability to
resist demands for disclosure of smartphone footage becomes a
concern for professional and amateur journalists alike who capture
potentially incriminating activities. Under what circumstances may
law enforcement compel an individual to unlock a smartphone?
Moreover, even if compelled unlocking is permissible, what limits
does the law impose on law enforcement’s authority to view the
smartphone's contents?
News organizations are increasingly urging journalists to protect
their data while covering protests. Mindful of the potential for law
enforcement to seize journalists’ devices, news outlets train their
journalists to use various locking methods so that material recorded

8

See Buchanan, Bui & Patel, supra note 3 (characterizing protests against
police violence as “the largest movement in the country’s history” with estimates
of participation ranging from 15 million people to as many as 26 million people);
Sarah Frostenson, The Women’s Marches May Have Been the Largest
Demonstration in US History, VOX (Jan. 31, 2017, 11:11 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2017/1/22/14350808/womens-marches-largestdemonstration-us-history-map [https://perma.cc/G397-TEVT] (stating that
“scientists think we may have just witnessed the largest day of demonstrations in
American history,” with 4.2 million people marching in 600-plus U.S. cities in
protest of Donald Trump’s inauguration as president); see also Brooke Auxier,
Activism on Social Media Varies by Race and Ethnicity, Age, Political Party, PEW
RSCH.
CTR.
(July
13,
2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/07/13/activism-on-social-media-varies-by-race-and-ethnicity-agepolitical-party/ [https://perma.cc/XD9W-ACRC] (reporting survey findings that
about one-third of social media users say they have used social media in the past
month to post a picture to show support for a cause, to look up information about
rallies or protests, or to encourage others to take action on issues they care about).
9
See Cindy Von Quednow, Long Beach Police Seek Evidence of ‘Criminal
Activity’ During Recent Protests Using New Online Portal, KTLA (June 4, 2020,
5:30 PM), https://ktla.com/news/local-news/long-beach-police-seek-evidence-ofcriminal-activity-during-recent-protests-using-new-online-portal/
[https://perma.cc/P7MZ-RN2P] (reporting that a California police department and
the FBI created an online portal to solicit smartphone footage from racial unrest
that resulted in property damage).
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on a confiscated phone is not readily viewable.10 Case law
interpreting the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and the rarelylitigated Privacy Protection Act of 1980, provides a helpful guide
for journalists seeking to secure the data on their smartphones.11
This case law, however, does not provide perfect clarity on
smartphone data protection.12 Thus, anyone taking to the streets to
participate in, or cover, protests should be aware of these legal
ambiguities and take practical steps to minimize the need to litigate
on uncertain footing.
This Article examines the tension between law enforcement and
photojournalists, both professional and amateur, and how that
tension has regularly produced conflict over the interest of police in
solving crimes and the interest of journalists in maintaining their
professional detachment from police to disseminate essential
information to the public. This tension is as old as photojournalism.
However, new technologies have blurred the lines between
journalists and bystanders, creating far more opportunities for
conflict and confusion, as police now look to the increasingly
tempting shortcut of cellphone video footage to solve crimes.
Specifically, this Article considers the not-uncommon scenario of
law enforcement officers seeking to unlock a secured smartphone to
examine its contents, and evaluates which types of security—
numeric passcode or biometric trigger—might give journalists the
best chance of being able to control access to their work product.
Part II looks at instances where the interests of police and
videographers have come into conflict at scenes of civil unrest and
why the legal system recognizes the importance of enabling
journalists to resist demands to surrender their unpublished work. In
Part III, this Article examines the legal bases on which a journalist
might legitimately resist a demand to surrender work product stored
on a smartphone. Specifically, Part III discusses the Fifth
Amendment and a growing body of diverging judicial
interpretations of whether a person suspected of wrongdoing can be
10

See Maddy Varner, How Do I Prepare My Phone for a Protest?, THE
MARKUP (June 4, 2020), https://themarkup.org/ask-the-markup/2020/06/04/howdo-i-prepare-my-phone-for-a-protest [https://perma.cc/M2KB-Q7AT].
11
See infra Parts III, IV, and V.
12
See infra Part VI.
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compelled to unlock a phone or surrender the information enabling
police to unlock it. Part IV considers the Fourth Amendment
arguments that might arise when police search or seize a smartphone
and how federal courts—including the Supreme Court in its 2014
Riley v. California ruling13—are coming to recognize the singularly
intrusive nature of a smartphone search.14 Part V discusses a littleknown statutory shield, the federal Privacy Protection Act of 1980,
and how that statute can deter and penalize over-eager officers who
seek to pry into journalists’ phones. Given the state of constitutional
and statutory protections against over-intrusive searches, Part VI
subsequently analyzes where the law is clear, as well as unclear, on
whether law enforcement agents may demand access to footage of
protests or other “breaking” on-scene news and how journalists
might maximize their chances of protecting the confidential contents
of their phones. Finally, Part VII emphasizes the importance of
preparing smartphone journalists for the risk of adverse interactions
with law enforcement while covering fast-breaking news in the field
because—constitutional principles notwithstanding—journalists
have struggled to use the legal system to curb overreaching by law
enforcement officials.
II.

THE CAMERA NEVER BLINKS – BUT SOMETIMES, IT
SQUEALS
While journalists have an obvious personal stake in avoiding
search, detention, and arrest on the job, the public also benefits from
robust protection of news organizations’ ability to safely gather
information at scenes of civil unrest. This newsgathering includes
unpaid “citizen journalists” who, increasingly, are fulfilling the
information needs of communities that lack well-supported
professional newsrooms. Though not unanimous, there is broad
consensus that journalists should have some degree of evidentiary
privilege against surrendering their confidential work product to
authorities. But for that legal protection to have any practical value,
police must be restricted from preemptively seizing journalists’
13

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
See id. at 402 (holding that, given the unique privacy concerns at stake in
regard to one’s smartphone, a search warrant is generally required).
14
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recording devices and inspecting the contents before a judge can
even consider whether privilege applies.
A. Public Reliance on Professional and Amateur News Footage
Alongside celebrated professional journalists from The New
York Times, The Washington Post, the Associated Press, and
Reuters, the 2021 Pulitzer Prizes for journalism recognized a
seventeen-year-old Minnesota teen whose act of videography—
capturing the murder of George Floyd at the hands of a Minneapolis
police officer—may have been the most impactful act of “citizen
journalism” of all time.15 That the world’s most prestigious
journalism awards recognized an act of amateur smartphone
videography underscores the blurring distinction between
“journalist” and “bystander” and how unpaid citizen “watchdogs”
can use smartphone technology to perform journalistic functions
when news is unfolding.
Mainstream community news organizations have drastically
downsized their staffing as advertising and circulation revenues dry
up; photojournalism positions have been especially hard-hit.16 This
downsizing has made newsrooms increasingly dependent on “oneman-band” mobile journalists, who record smartphone videos when
15

See Elahe Izadi, Darnella Frazier, the Teen Who Filmed George Floyd’s
Murder, Awarded a Pulitzer Citation, WASH. POST (June 11, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/media/2021/06/11/darnella-frazier-pulitzergeorge-floyd-witness/ [https://perma.cc/J8SR-MHXS].
16
See Monica Anderson, At Newspapers, Photographers Feel the Brunt of Job
Cuts, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 11, 2013), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2013/11/11/at-newspapers-photographers-feel-the-brunt-of-job-cuts/
[https://perma.cc/9EF8-WGB6] (reporting that photography jobs in U.S.
newsrooms dropped 43% between 2000 and 2012, outpacing the rate of erosion
of other fast-disappearing journalism jobs). The Chicago Sun-Times and the New
York Daily News are among the major metropolitan daily publications that
eliminated substantially all of their full-time photography jobs in recent years.
Tom Burton, NY Daily News Eliminates Photographers’ Jobs in Massive Layoffs,
NAT’L PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERS ASS’N (July 25, 2018), https://nppa.org/news/nydaily-news-eliminates-photo-staff
[https://perma.cc/2BFU-LL2W];
Mark
Memmott, ‘Chicago Sun-Times’ Fires Its Photographers, NPR.ORG (May 30,
2013,
1:48
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/05/30/
187292393/chicago-sun-times-fires-its-photographers [https://perma.cc/3S88DSDX].
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reporting from the field.17 Additionally, short-staffed newsrooms
are more reliant on video contributed by eyewitnesses or reshared
from non-journalists’ social media pages.18 The increasing quality
and user-friendliness of smartphone cameras enable a relative
novice to shoot images that, if not a substitute for the craftsmanship
of well-trained photojournalists, are at least a serviceable standby.19
The ubiquity of high-quality smartphones has also increased the
opportunity for confrontations with law enforcement officers at
scenes of newsworthy events. Instead of having to deal with one or
two news photographers carrying conspicuous camera equipment
and who are readily recognizable as journalists, police now must
assume that any bystander can photograph, record, or livestream to
a potentially limitless online audience. As one commentator has
observed:
Police face potential bombardment from videographers because
recording devices are cheaper and handier than ever. Due to the
proliferation of inexpensive recording technology, police encounters in
public are more commonly captured on portable media that can be

17
See Robert Corn-Revere, Protecting the Tools of Modern Journalism, 30
COMMC’NS L. 9, 9 (2014) (“Media outlets increasingly issue reporters
smartphones to take photographs and to record other story elements.”).
18
For an especially vivid illustration, see Otto v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 345
F. Supp. 3d 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). In Otto, a bank executive attending a wedding
at the Trump National Golf Club in New Jersey snapped an iPhone photo of thenPresident Donald Trump unexpectedly popping into the reception to congratulate
the bride and groom. Id. at 420. He shared the photo with several other guests,
one of whom posted the photo to a personal Instagram account, where
professional news outlets, including the website for Esquire magazine, discovered
the post and—without obtaining permission from the creator—copied and
republished the picture online. Id. at 421. The amateur photographer sued Esquire
owner Hearst for copyright infringement, and a federal district court found for the
photographer, holding that the appropriation did not qualify for the defense of fair
use. Id. at 433. The district court awarded the photographer minimal damages of
$750. Clerk’s Judgment, Otto v. Hearst Commc’ns., Inc., No. 1:17-cv-04712GHW (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2020).
19
See Terry Sullivan, A Beginner’s Guide to Taking Great Video on Your
Phone, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/17/
smarter-living/beginners-guide-phone-video.html [https://perma.cc/GJ5M-TQTT]
(observing that improvements in smartphone technology have enabled even
professional filmmakers to use smartphones in place of traditional video cameras).
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disseminated almost instantly, allowing the public to constantly
scrutinize and form opinions about the police.20

The presence of such pervasive scrutiny is, perhaps
understandably, threatening to some officers, who fear that videos
will be mischaracterized or deceptively edited. Until recently,
officers enjoyed the advantage of having the only video of most
confrontations with civilians, plus the intrinsic “benefit of the
doubt” that their testimony carried weight when a situation involved
merely the uncorroborated word of a civilian witness against that of
an officer.21
The heightened tension between law enforcement and
smartphone journalists has manifested in arrests, beatings, and the
destruction or seizure of recording equipment. In Baltimore, for
instance, police confiscated a smartphone and deleted its video
contents merely because a bystander recorded the arrest of a fellow
attendee at a horserace to the chagrin of the arresting officers.22 In
Philadelphia, a college student photographing police making a
traffic stop in his neighborhood as part of a class photojournalism
assignment was thrown to the ground and handcuffed.23 The college
student and his girlfriend, who tried to come to his aid, were charged
with obstruction and disorderly conduct.24 In jurisdictions across the
20

David Murphy, Comment, “V.I.P.” Videographer Intimidation Protection:
How the Government Should Protect Citizens Who Videotape the Police, 43
SETON HALL L. REV. 319, 327 (2013).
21
See id. at 330 (stating that, before the widespread availability of home video
cameras and, later, smartphones, “[p]olice previously enjoyed a monopoly over
the ability to record public confrontations using cameras in cruisers and recording
equipment attached to officers”).
22
See Derek Valcourt, Landmark Settlement Reached in Preakness Arrest
Case; New Police Policy Spells Out Recording Rights, CBS LOCAL (Mar. 12,
2014, 5:40 PM), https://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2014/03/12/landmark-settlementreached-in-preakness-arrest-case/ [https://perma.cc/H74T-KT5Z] (reporting that,
after nearly four years of litigation, the City of Baltimore agreed to pay a sixfigure settlement plus attorney fees to the videographer, as well as clarify police
department policies to protect the right to record officers).
23
Dan Reimold, Temple Student Sues Over Arrest for Photojournalism Class
Assignment, USA TODAY (Mar. 16, 2014, 7:43 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/college/2014/03/16/temple-student-sues-over-arrest-for-photojournalismclass-assignment/37439061/ [https://perma.cc/S45L-RMYV].
24
Id.
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country, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has filed
lawsuits accusing police of similar excesses, attesting to the
regularity of confrontations with “citizen journalists” for filming
police activity.25
Advances in facial recognition technology, as well as a growing
archive of surveillance videos against which to match faces, make
smartphone video an even more useful tool for investigating
crimes.26 For example, after rioters loyal to outgoing President
Donald Trump stormed the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, in an
attempt to stop Congress from certifying the results of the 2020
presidential election, investigators used bystander-shot video to
track down and arrest scores of suspected participants in the
mayhem.27
Of course, no law exists to stop police from viewing footage
publicly shared to YouTube, Instagram, or any other video-sharing
platform. Once an image is posted to social media, the law
25

See Beth Burger, ACLU of Ohio Sues Columbus Police After Hilltop Man
Arrested for Recording SWAT Officers, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Jan. 12, 2021,
2:30 PM), https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/2021/01/11/aclu-sues-columbuspolice-after-man-arrested-recording-officers/6630973002/ [https://perma.cc/9NXQ26KZ] (reporting that a bystander alleged a SWAT team arrested him for filming
a SWAT team raid of a neighbor’s house from his own front porch); Lawsuit
Alleges Police Seized Cellphone Without Warrant, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 13,
2020), https://apnews.com/article/fa8a33d6fc823d532ba94ad0e24a4d48 [https://
perma.cc/3AER-ZKCF] (reporting that a bystander alleged the police arrested
him for shooting a smartphone video of officers responding to a fight outside of a
convenience store); Kim Zetter, ACLU Sues Police for Seizing Man’s Phone After
Recording Alleged Misconduct, WIRED (Sept. 7, 2012, 3:02 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2012/09/man-sues-police-over-phone/ [https://perma.cc
/8M9Q-G3X9] (describing a lawsuit that alleged the police grabbed an
eyewitness’ smartphone and stole its memory card because the eyewitness was
filming officers beating a suspect).
26
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Facial Recognition and the Fourth
Amendment, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1105, 1119–24 (2021) (explaining how police use
face identification technology to match a suspect’s face against other available
images, and how commercially available technology is making it easier, even for
small police departments, to use facial recognition).
27
Craig Timberg, Drew Harwell & Spencer S. Hsu, Police Let Most Capitol
Rioters Walk Away. But Cellphone Data and Videos Could Now Lead To More
Arrests., WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2021, 5:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2021/01/08/trump-mob-tech-arrests/ [https://perma.cc/7TUJ-EKWY].
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recognizes that there is no “expectation of privacy” in content
willfully shared to the public; thus, viewing the image does not
constitute a “search” triggering constitutional safeguards.28 But,
when police insist on viewing or—even more invasively—taking
possession of unpublished videos of newsworthy events, both
constitutional and statutory safeguards may be triggered.
B. Why Confidentiality Matters
Society has long recognized that the public benefits when
journalists are free to gather and report news without undue
governmental interference. For this reason, the legal system
sometimes puts journalists in a preferred position that recognizes
their role as the eyes and ears of the general public.29 Nearly every
state recognizes some degree of evidentiary privilege, entitling
journalists to refuse demands to surrender confidential information
in connection with legal proceedings where ordinary citizens would
be compelled to comply.30 As with other evidentiary privileges,
these “shield laws” are built around recognizing that the public has
a profound interest in the flow of truthful and timely information to
28
See, e.g., Chaney v. Fayette Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1308,
1317 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (finding that a student whose Facebook photos were
humiliatingly displayed at a school assembly had no constitutional claim because
society would not recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy for photos
voluntarily posted to a publicly viewable social media page).
29
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1980)
(“Instead of acquiring information about trials by firsthand observation or by word
of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the print
and electronic media. In a sense, this validates the media claim of functioning as
surrogates for the public.”). Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. made this point in his
dissent in Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., in which he argued for recognizing a First
Amendment right for journalists to gain access to interviews with prison inmates:
“An informed public depends on accurate and effective reporting by the news
media. No individual can obtain for himself the information needed for the
intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities. For most citizens the prospect
of personal familiarity with newsworthy events is hopelessly unrealistic. In
seeking out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of the public at large.”
417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
30
See Christina Koningisor, The De Facto Reporter’s Privilege, 127 YALE L.J.
1176, 1202 (2018) (explaining that every state (except Wyoming) recognizes
some degree of journalist’s privilege by way of statute, common law, or
constitutional interpretation).
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journalists. Therefore, public interest can override the normal
expectation that witnesses must cooperate in providing testimony
and any physical evidence in their possession.31 Highlighting this
principle, law professor Christina Koningisor asserted that “the most
common justification for the reporter’s privilege today is that
revealing confidential information would cause reporters’ sources to
dry up. This, in turn, would stem the flow of information to the
press—and by extension—to the public.”32 Professor Koningisor’s
assertion is representative of a 1981 holding from the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, whereby the Court drew a direct link between the
journalist’s ability to protect his confidential source and the public’s
access to candid information.33 Ruling in favor of a journalist whose
testimony was sought in a civil lawsuit over leaked government
documents identifying suspected organized crime figures, the court
reasoned:
Without an unfettered press, citizens would be far less able to make
informed political, social, and economic choices. But the press’ function
as a vital source of information is weakened whenever the ability of
journalists to gather news is impaired. Compelling a reporter to disclose
the identity of a source may significantly interfere with this news
gathering ability; journalists frequently depend on informants to gather
news, and confidentiality is often essential to establishing a relationship
with an informant.34

Although generally referred to as a “reporter’s” privilege, the
benefit of this privilege more directly flows to the source of the
photo or video. In fact, one state, Wisconsin, has explicitly
denominated its statute as a whistleblower protection law rather than

31

See David Abramowicz, Calculating the Public Interest in Protecting
Journalists’ Confidential Sources, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1949, 1954
(2008) (“[P]roponents argue that the ability to promise confidentiality facilitates
newsgathering. Such newsgathering can serve the public interest, such as when
unnamed sources blow the whistle on government or corporate corruption.”); see
also id. at 1955 (discussing an additional rationale for why conscripting
journalists as frequent witnesses for the government could compromise their
independence).
32
Koningisor, supra note 30, at 1180.
33
Id.
34
Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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a journalist protection law.35 While journalists theoretically can be
fined—or, in extreme cases, jailed—for refusing to cooperate with
demands for evidence,36 such sanctions are infrequent.37 Instead, the
true “skin in the game” belongs to the person who provided the
information to the journalist: the person who could be in jeopardy
of being fired or criminally prosecuted for leaking the information.38
Considerable debate exists concerning the proper scope of the
privilege: who should be covered, what material should be subject
to withholding, and in which types of proceedings the privilege
should apply.39 For more than a century, courts have recognized the
35

See Erik Ugland, The Reporter’s Privilege Goes Incognito in Wisconsin,
MARQ. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (May 31, 2010), https://law.marquette.edu/
facultyblog/2010/05/the-reporters-privilege-goes-incognito-in-wisconsin/
[https://perma.cc/LBN6-M2BH] (“[S]upporters of the new law have deliberately
flown it under the radar and have presented [it] more as a boon for citizenwatchdogs than reporters.”).
36
See Markus E. Apelis, Fit to Print? Consequences of Implementing a Federal
Reporter’s Privilege, 58 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (2008) (stating that
more than twenty U.S. journalists were known to have been jailed between 1972
and 2008 for defying judicial directives to disclose confidential material,
including Joshua Wolf, a California videographer and blogger, who was held on
contempt charges for 226 days for refusing to furnish video of a protest sought by
federal law enforcement agents as part of a grand jury investigation).
37
In a 2003 report, the nonprofit Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
stated that, over the preceding ten years, only five reporters had been jailed
anywhere in the United States for refusing to give evidence in court. New York
Times Reporters Refuse to Answer Questions About Sources, REPS. COMM. FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Dec. 19, 2003), https://www.rcfp.org/new-york-timesreporters-refuse-answer-questions-about-sources/
[https://perma.cc/M7CY73MX].
38
See Note, The Rights of Sources – The Critical Element in the Clash Over
Reporter’s Privilege, 88 YALE L.J. 1202, 1203–04 (1979) (“A source’s interests
. . . are qualitatively different and far more compelling than those of a reporter.”);
see also id. at 1210–12 (opining that compelled disclosure of a journalist’s
unnamed source implicates the speaker’s constitutional right of freedom of
association, as well as freedom of speech).
39
See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege,
91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 549 (2007) (describing the “disagreement among the states
regarding whether shield laws should protect the identity of both nonconfidential
sources and confidential sources; whether the privilege should extend to
newsgathering materials; and whether publication is required before the
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existence of some common-law protection for the confidentiality of
newsgathering, though the breadth and durability of protection have
varied.40 While the First Amendment offers some protection for the
act of gathering news, the Supreme Court has neither specified the
metes-and-bounds of that protection nor determined what level of
showing a government agency must make to override the
protection.41 In general, the Supreme Court has resisted recognizing
any special legal status for professional newsgatherers above and
beyond the legal rights of ordinary citizen bystanders.42
The Supreme Court’s limited engagement with the concept of a
journalist’s privilege in Branzburg v. Hayes43 left First Amendment
law in a state of uncertainty.44 In Branzburg, a closely divided
protection can be invoked” among other variations regarding the scope of
coverage); see also id. at 566–67 (describing states’ varying interpretations as to
what amount of journalistic employment is necessary to qualify a person to take
advantage of the reporter’s privilege).
40
See Koningisor, supra note 30, at 1213–14 (tracing the evolution of the
common-law privilege to gather information in early twentieth century case law).
41
See Nicholas J. Jacques, Information Gathering in the Era of Mobile
Technology: Towards a Liberal Right to Record, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 785
(2017) (“The Supreme Court and lower courts have developed this First
Amendment right to gather information in a patchwork of cases over the past forty
years, but the Court has never explained its exact origins or rationale.”) (citation
omitted).
42
See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (rejecting the proposition that
the press has a First Amendment right of access to enter prisons to conduct
interviews: “The Constitution does not . . . require government to accord the press
special access to information not shared by members of the public generally”);
see also Genevra Kay Loveland, Newsgathering: Second-Class Right Among
First Amendment Freedoms, 53 TEX. L. REV. 1440, 1445–46 (1975) (citing Pell
as among the rulings that “dimmed for the foreseeable future the press’ hope of
convincing the Court that the first amendment grants to the press, as a
representative of the public, a special right of access to information of public
concern”).
43
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
44
Id.; see also Sonja R. West, Concurring in Part & Concurring in the
Confusion, 104 MICH. L REV. 1951, 1953–54 (2006) (using the Branzburg case,
in which no rationale attracted a majority and Justice Lewis Powell’s concurrence
provided the decisive fifth vote, to illustrate how partial versus full concurrences
have caused interpretive difficulties); Robert T. Sherwin, “Source” of Protection:
The Status of the Reporter’s Privilege in Texas and a Call to Arms for the State’s
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Supreme Court ruled that there was no First Amendment-based
privilege, which would have entitled journalists to refuse to answer
questions about their work if subpoenaed to testify in a criminal
investigation before a grand jury.45 The decisive fifth vote came
from Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., whose concurring opinion
suggested that the First Amendment might supply a privilege against
testifying in settings other than a criminal grand jury probe, where
the need for information is uniquely urgent.46 When combined with
the votes of the four dissenters, Powell’s concurrence can be read as
recognizing a constitutionally-based privilege on, as Powell wrote,
“a case-by-case basis.”47
In the aftermath of Branzburg, most federal courts have
concluded that the Constitution affords some degree of protection
enabling journalists to keep confidences, emanating from the First
Amendment right to gather information.48 For instance, just a few
years after Branzburg, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals declined
to follow the Supreme Court’s narrow precedent when the demand
for disclosure of a journalist’s confidential source came in a civil
lawsuit; the public interest in disclosure was less compelling than in
a criminal grand jury investigation.49 The D.C. Circuit wrote:
Compelling a reporter to disclose the identity of a confidential source
raises obvious First Amendment problems. The First Amendment
guarantees a free press primarily because of the important role it can play
Legislators and Journalists, 32 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 137, 147–48 (2000)
(suggesting that Powell’s concurrence plus the dissenting votes constitute a
majority for some “qualified” level of constitutionally-based reporter’s privilege,
but caveating: “It is unclear whether this interpretation is accurate; the Supreme
Court has not since directly readdressed the issue, leaving lower courts with the
difficult task of deciphering Branzburg’s meaning”).
45
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693 (“[T]he evidence fails to demonstrate that
there would be a significant constriction of the flow of news to the public if this
Court reaffirms the prior common-law and constitutional rule regarding the
testimonial obligations of newsmen.”).
46
See id. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring).
47
Id. at 710. Powell’s brief, three-paragraph opinion was unilluminating even
to his fellow justices, one of whom called it “enigmatic.” See id. at 725 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
48
See Abramowicz, supra note 31, at 1957 (observing that “nearly every federal
circuit recognizes some degree of journalist’s privilege”).
49
Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 707, 711–12 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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as a vital source of public information . . . . Without an unfettered press,
citizens would be far less able to make informed political, social, and
economic choices. But the press’ function as a vital source of
information is weakened whenever the ability of journalists to gather
news is impaired. Compelling a reporter to disclose the identity of a
source may significantly interfere with this news gathering ability;
journalists frequently depend on informants to gather news, and
confidentiality is often essential to establishing a relationship with an
informant.50

When a dispute involves a physical search for confidential
information rather than (as in Branzburg) a demand for testimony,
courts do not generally consider the First Amendment to provide
special protection against being searched, leaving the Fourth
Amendment to carry the load.51 The lack of consensus as to whether,
and to what extent, a constitutionally-based right exists to refuse to
divulge unpublished newsgathering work product means that
journalists, and those who share confidences with journalists, are
heavily reliant on state privilege statutes.
Privilege statutes, however, largely predate the development of
ubiquitous handheld video cameras and online file-sharing.
Therefore, courts have been asked to adapt decades-old notions of
“journalism” for the social media era, with varying outcomes.52 In
2011, a state court judge initially denied the benefit of privilege to a
technology blog that did not fit the literal description of an eligible
50

Id. at 710–11 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
See Alex Abdo, Why Rely on the Fourth Amendment to Do the Work of the
First?, 127 YALE L.J.F. 444, 451–53 (2017) (opining that courts should recognize
a First Amendment-based privilege protecting the privacy of confidential
information where disclosure might chill the flow of information but observing
that courts have thus far failed to do so, leaving the Fourth Amendment as the
only recourse).
52
See Jason A. Martin & Anthony L. Fargo, Rebooting Shield Laws: Updating
Journalist’s Privilege to Reflect the Realities of Digital Newsgathering, 24 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 65 (2013) (observing that, as of 2013, only “a handful”
of privilege statutes had been updated to add references to the Internet or online
publishing); William E. Lee, Citizen-Critics, Citizen Journalists, and the Perils
of Defining the Press, 48 GA. L. REV. 757, 776–78 (2014) (contrasting analyses
applied by courts in Oregon, where a blogger was deemed insufficiently
journalistic to qualify for the reporter’s privilege, versus courts in New Jersey,
where a blogger was deemed to qualify as a journalist despite flouting some
traditional professional norms).
51
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“news medium” under the Illinois reporter shield law but ultimately
reconsidered and reversed its decision.53 More recently, a trial court,
applying Nevada’s half-century-old shield law, ruled that a blogger
was not entitled to claim protection against disclosure of
confidential sources.54 The Nevada Supreme Court did, however,
overturn the decision, saying that online newspapers were entitled
to the protection of their sources.55 In general, the law has
increasingly accepted that the reporter’s privilege should apply
functionally, based on whether the seeker of the privilege shows a
pattern of having regularly engaged in gathering and disseminating
news, regardless of format or professional status.56 The legal system
is thus evolving to recognize that people gathering images who are
not full-time-salaried journalists nevertheless make valuable
contributions to the flow of newsworthy information.
States also have different understandings about how much
material journalists may defensibly withhold and under what
circumstances journalists may withhold such material.57 The
53

See Martin & Fargo, supra note 51, at 48–49 (describing a lawsuit involving
website TechnoBuffalo, which was hit with a demand to disclose the source of a
news tip alleged to have revealed trade secrets about a forthcoming Motorola
smartphone model).
54
See Marcella Corona, Nevada Judge Rules Online Journalist Must Reveal
Sources, Not Protected by Media Shield Law, RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL (Mar. 7,
2019, 11:50 AM), https://www.rgj.com/story/news/2019/03/07/nevada-judgerules-online-sites-not-protected-media-shield-law/3091926002/
[https://perma.cc/4Z3T-T5J7] (describing backlash over the trial court’s ruling,
which based denial of the recognition of the right to protect gathered information
on evidence that the publication did not appear in “print” and that the blogger was
not a dues-paying member of the state press association at the time the disputed
news articles were published).
55
See Toll v. Wilson, 453 P.3d 1215, 1219 (Nev. 2019) (stating that “just
because a newspaper can exist online, . . . does not mean it ceases to be a
newspaper”).
56
See Martin & Fargo, supra note 51, at 85, 93 (commenting that courts have
extended protection to bloggers when their “output substantively resemble[s] [that
of more] traditional news media,” but courts have denied coverage to purported
journalists who are unable to show a pattern of previous journalistic output).
57
See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 379 F. Supp. 2d 680, 686–89
(M.D. Pa. 2005) (recognizing that reporters could be compelled to testify about
what they witnessed at a school board meeting that was viewable to the public but
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privilege may be “absolute” (i.e., no circumstances allow for an
override of the privilege) or “qualified” (i.e., a judge can compel
disclosure if the proponent makes an overriding showing of need).58
Moreover, the privilege may apply only to information gathered
under a promise of confidentiality, or the privilege may apply more
broadly to any unpublished journalistic work product.59 When the
dispute involves footage shot at a public event, the scope of the
privilege statute can be decisive; images of protesters are rarely
obtained under a promise of anonymity, as opposed to recordings of
interviews with individuals, which may well have been.60
Just as the reporter’s privilege benefits those who confidentially
furnish information to the press (often insisting on anonymity out of
fear of retaliatory workplace consequences), the ability to secure a
journalist’s smartphone protects those whose communications with
journalists might otherwise be exposed by a search. Reviewing the
contents of a journalist’s phone could compromise a confidential
source’s communications directly (e.g., conversations or copies of
leaked documents that are stored on the phone) or indirectly (e.g.,
the confidential source appears in the journalist’s address book and
has corresponded with the journalist). Because third-party interests
are so directly implicated—indeed, the risk to the source may be
significantly greater than any peril to the journalist—a smartphone
search is not entirely analogous to the more traditional types of
could not be compelled to surrender their notes or unpublished work product). See
also Bartlett v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Pima, 722 P.2d 346, 350 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986) (interpreting narrowly Arizona’s reporter’s privilege statute to
apply to material gathered only under a promise of confidentiality: “[T]he claim
of privilege depends, in the first instance, upon the existence of a confidential
relationship such that compliance with a subpoena would either result in
disclosure of confidential information or sources or would seriously interfere with
the news gathering and editorial process”).
58
See Koningisor, supra note 30, at 1203, 1203 n.148 (explaining that privilege
may be regarded as absolute or qualified, and providing illustrative contrasting
statutes).
59
See id. at 1203–04 nn.149–50, 154 (offering examples of shield laws that
differ in their protection of nonconfidential information).
60
See, e.g., Kitzmiller, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 686–89; see also Bartlett, 722 P.2d
at 350 (drawing a decisive contrast between information received in confidence
from an interviewee, which is protected by privilege, versus a video recording of
a non-confidential event, which raises none of the same concerns).
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searches around which search-and-seizure legal principles have
evolved (for instance, a drunk-driving breathalyzer or blood test).61
C. From Journalist to Jailbird
Whether because journalists are either purposefully targeted by
police for gathering news or are merely caught in the net alongside
demonstrators, journalists not infrequently find themselves facing
arrest and/or prosecution as a result of documenting scenes of civil
unrest. During the nationwide wave of racial justice protests
triggered by the killing of George Floyd, the U.S. Press Freedom
Tracker, a nonprofit organization, recorded more than 600 instances
of law enforcement officers “arresting, detaining, or engaging in
acts of physical aggression against journalists.”62
The scale of the George Floyd protests was unpresedented, but
the peril to journalists was not; when crowds of people confront
police, journalists frequently find themselves in the legal crosshairs.
For example, at least ninety journalists were arrested in twelve
different cities during the “Occupy Wall Street” economic justice
protests of 2011, which originated in New York but spawned lookalike “Occupy” encampments in public spaces from coast to coast.63
While in Ferguson, Missouri covering demonstrations following the
fatal police shooting of Black teenager Michael Brown in 2014,
Washington Post reporter Wesley Lowery and Huffington Post
reporter Ryan Reilly were arrested simply for failing to immediately
leave a McDonald’s restaurant when ordered by police.64 During the
61

See Aaron Chase, Secure the Smartphone, Secure the Future: Biometrics,
Boyd, a Warrant Denial and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 17 HASTINGS
RACE & POVERTY L.J. 577, 587 (2020) (explaining that courts have generally
declined to protect against compelled disclosure of data that is accessible to third
parties, such as a phone carrier’s log of the phone numbers that a smartphone
owner dialed, but have been more protective when the disclosure involves the
content of conversations as opposed to data).
62
See Sonja R. West, The Majoritarian Press Clause, 2020 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
311, 324 (2020).
63
Corn-Revere, supra note 17, at 10.
64
Angela Rulffes, The First Amendment in Times of Crisis: An Analysis of Free
Press Issues in Ferguson, Missouri, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 607, 613–14 (2018).
St. Louis County authorities did not file criminal charges until nearly a year after
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same Ferguson events, Gerald “Trey” Yingst, a college student
working as a journalist for the website News2Share, was arrested
and charged with unlawful assembly, failure to obey a lawful order,
and interfering with the duties of a police officer while standing on
a public sidewalk shooting news video during a protest.65
When protests erupted surrounding Donald Trump’s January
2017 presidential inauguration, the Washington, D.C. Police
arrested six journalists covering the unrest; the charges included
rioting, which is a felony carrying a potential ten-year prison
sentence.66 One of the journalists, freelance writer Aaron Cantú,
who was under a cloud of felony charges for nearly eighteen months
until federal prosecutors dismissed the case, claimed that federal law
enforcement officers extracted data from potentially hundreds of
arrestees’ confiscated phones but were unable to crack his phone
(“thanks to strong encryption”).67 Alexi Wood, a San Antonio-based
photojournalist, could have faced up to seventy years in prison after
being arrested while livestreaming scenes of the Trump inaugural
protests on his smartphone.68 His incitement case went all the way

the arrests, dropping them only when, nine months later, the journalists entered
into an agreement not to sue. Id. at 630.
65
See Michael Calderone, Trey Yingst, Journalist Arrested In Ferguson, Wins
Settlement From St. Louis County, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 3, 2015, 11:50 AM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trey-yingst-journalist-arrested-in-fergusonwins-settlement-from-st-louis-county_n_55b7f4bfe4b0224d88345c7d
[https://perma.cc/L79V-MMBG] (reporting that charges were dropped, and an
$8,500 settlement was paid to resolve Yingst’s civil lawsuit against St. Louis
County challenging the legal basis for his arrest).
66
Rulffes, supra note 63, at 631.
67
Aaron Cantú, The Feds Tried to Lock Up a Journalist for Life for Reporting
on Inauguration Protests. This Is His True Story of Conspiracy in Trump’s
America, INDY WEEK (Aug. 1, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://indyweek.com/news/fedstried-lock-journalist-life-reporting-inauguration-protests.-true-story-conspiracytrump-s-america./ [https://perma.cc/MX8D-ATVU].
68
Alex Zilensky, SA Photojournalist Alexei Wood Found Not Guilty on All 7
Inauguration Day Charges, SAN ANTONIO CURRENT (Dec. 21, 2017, 11:47 AM),
https://www.sacurrent.com/the-daily/archives/2017/12/21/sa-photojournalistalexei-wood-found-not-guilty-on-all-7-inauguration-day-charges
[https://perma.cc/UCL4-YY4U].
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to trial; however, the case resulted in a December 2017 not-guilty
verdict on all counts.69
Even though journalists seldom end up being convicted of a
crime arising out of newsgathering,70 simply being arrested carries
real costs. An arrest interrupts journalists’ ability to continue
producing coverage, obligates the journalists or their employers to
pay for legal defense, and inflicts a chilling effect, inhibiting future
coverage.71
The charges brought against journalists frequently amount to
insignificant “nuisance” charges that prosecutors typically drop,
such as jaywalking.72 But police have an arsenal of rather vague and
easily violated criminal codes at their disposal, including the catchall charge of disorderly conduct, which can be violated in some
jurisdictions simply by using loud profanities in a public place.73
69

Id.
See Lee Levine, Nathan E. Siegel & Jeanette Melendez Bead, Handcuffing
the Press: First Amendment Limitations on the Reach of Criminal Statutes as
Applied to the Media, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1015, 1030 (2011) (citations
omitted) (observing that prosecutors seldom proceed with cases against
journalists except for “the rare circumstance where they directly committed an
unlawful physical act, such as removing a piece of debris from the wreckage of a
sabotaged aircraft, ‘stealing documents,’ or engaging in ‘private wiretapping’”).
71
See Murphy, supra note 20, at 337; see also Index Newspapers v. City of
Portland, 480 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1131–34, 1143 (D. Or. 2020) (discussing
journalists who were shot with non-lethal munitions, gassed, pepper-sprayed, and
otherwise targeted by police while covering racial unrest in Portland, Oregon and
subsequently testified that they refrained from going back to demonstration sites
without protective gear, or cut their coverage short and left early, out of fear of
arrest or violence by the police).
72
See Rulffes, supra note 63, at 612 (recounting arrests of journalists during
the Occupy Wall Street movement: “Journalists who were arrested were charged
with violations that included disorderly conduct and unlawful assembly”).
73
See generally Alexandra Baruch Bachman, WTF? First Amendment
Implications of Policing Profanity, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 65, 80–84 (2018)
(examining state statutes and concluding that some broadly criminalize
“boisterous” or similarly nonviolent behavior that invites misapplication against
pure speech); see also Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words
Doctrine: An Argument for Its Interment, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1129, 1144 (1993)
(critiquing the breadth of statutes that criminalize speech constituting a “breach
of the peace” and commenting that “a disorderly conduct arrest often serves as
70
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That arsenal is augmented by state eavesdropping and wiretapping
statutes that police may construe as making it a crime to record a
conversation without the consent of all participants,74 even though
such arrests are on dubious constitutional grounding.75 As
demonstrated above, the possibility that a journalist assigned to a
scene of civil unrest may be drawn into the conflict as an arrestee is
not at all farfetched; therefore, it is prudent to anticipate the
information-security issues that might arise if police turn their sights
from protesters to the press.
D. Locking Eyes: How Biometric Security Works
The fact that smartphones contain all manner of intimate details
about people’s lives is well-recognized; indeed, people regard a
phone search as being comparably intrusive to a search of their own
bodies—with good reason.76 With an unlocked phone, the holder
punishment in and of itself rather than as the first step in the criminal process, thus
marginalizing judicial review’s capacity to mitigate the penalty imposed on a
speaker”). For a colorful example, see generally State v. Robinson, 82 P.3d 27,
28–29 (Mont. 2003) (holding that a speaker could constitutionally be prosecuted
under a “breach of the peace” statute for directing insults “f**king pig” and “f**k
off a**hole” at a police officer, because the insults were “fighting words”
unprotected by the First Amendment).
74
This scenario is what happened in the case of Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78,
80 (1st Cir. 2011), in which Boston police arrested a bystander for videotaping a
struggle during an arrest on a public thoroughfare on the Boston Commons,
claiming that the taping constituted wiretapping in violation of Massachusetts
criminal law—a charge that was ultimately found to be unsustainable under the
First Amendment.
75
See id. at 85 (concluding that “a citizen’s right to film government officials,
including law enforcement officers, in the discharge of their duties in a public
space is a basic, vital, and well-established liberty safeguarded by the First
Amendment”); see also Ashley Billam, The Public’s Evolution from News Reader
to News Gatherer: An Analysis of the First Amendment Right to Videorecord
Police, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 150 (2017) (collecting cases and observing that
“[m]ost of the courts presented with the question have found that the First
Amendment protects the public’s right to videorecord police”).
76
See Matthew B. Kugler, The Perceived Intrusiveness of Searching Electronic
Devices at the Border: An Empirical Study, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1165, 1166–67
(2014) (reporting results of a survey of 300 Americans about privacy concerns
associated with border crossings: “The results show that people see the
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can read the owner’s text messages, gain access to the owner’s email
and social media accounts, view the owner’s photographs and
videos, and even see which websites the owner has visited.77 For
these reasons, devices routinely come equipped with safety features
that prevent unauthorized access to their contents with additional
security options available for installation.78
The two most common types of phone locks require either the
entry of an alphanumeric passcode or the use of a biometric
indicator, such as a fingerprint, a scan of the owner’s face, or a
reading of the owner’s iris.79 Consumers have found biometric
security temptingly convenient and reassuring because numeric
codes can be forgotten, hacked, or, if written down, stolen or copied
by unauthorized people.80
intrusiveness of electronic-device searches as comparable to that of strip searches
and body cavity searches, which have generally been held to require elevated
suspicion. Electronic searches are the most revealing of sensitive information and
are only slightly less embarrassing than the most intimate searches of the body”
(emphasis omitted)).
77
See id. at 1185 (observing that smartphones “contain the most intimate details
of our lives: financial records, confidential business documents, medical records
and private emails . . . . highly revealing and embarrassing information”).
78
See Heather Kelly, Fingerprints and Face Scans Are the Future of
Smartphones. These Holdouts Refuse to Use Them., WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/15/fingerprints-facescans-are-future-smartphones-these-holdouts-refuse-use-them/
[https://perma.cc/FF98-JAU6] (describing how smartphone manufacturers Apple
and Samsung offer standard security features that require a facial or iris scan to
unlock the device, despite some customers’ discomfort with sharing biometric
data); see also Michael Grothaus, Use These 11 Critical iPhone Privacy and
Security Settings Right Now, FAST CO. (Feb. 18, 2020), https://
www.fastcompany.com/90254589/use-these-11-critical-iphone-privacy-andsecurity-settings-right-now [https://perma.cc/9NDX-44LY] (describing optional
tools users can install to make their phones and digital accounts more secure).
79
Carissa A. Uresk, Compelling Suspects to Unlock Their Phones:
Recommendations for Prosecutors and Law Enforcement, 46 BYU L. REV. 601,
609 (2021).
80
See Ariel N. Redfern, Face It – The Convenience of a Biometric Password
May Mean Forfeiting Your Fifth Amendment Rights, 125 PENN ST. L. REV. 597,
603 (2021) (“Rather than having to remember or type a lengthy password,
biometric passwords offer the convenience and speed of short passwords while
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Besides the locking device on the initial screen, smartphones
have increasingly been designed with an additional layer of
encryption protection, so that data is stored on the device as a
digitally scrambled garble—unreadable even to a person who might
be able to bypass the initial login-screen security.81 But technology
is rapidly overtaking even that additional safeguard. Police
reportedly have begun using a commercially available tool,
GrayKey, that can defeat the encryption that comes with the
operating system on today’s Apple iPhones so that the iPhone’s
encrypted contents are readable when the login security is
overcome.82 Nevertheless, for most government agencies, breaking
into a locked phone is “impractical for three reasons: (1) it is
expensive, (2) it takes time, and (3) the technology is constantly
changing.”83 Therefore, police still have every incentive to try to
convince—or compel—the owner to unlock the device on the spot.

providing enhanced security. Accordingly, technology experts widely agree that
biometric passwords are superior to their alphanumeric counterparts.”); see also
Adam Herrera, Biometric Passwords and the Fifth Amendment: How Technology
Has Outgrown the Right to Be Free From Self-Incrimination, 66 UCLA L. REV.
778, 784 (2019) (explaining that biometric passwords are more secure than
alphanumeric codes, as the default of a four-numeral passcode “can be hacked
through brute force in just seven minutes”). On the other hand, a letter-number
combination has one security advantage over biometrics: A combination can
easily be changed if it falls into the hands of hackers, while a person’s face or
fingerprints cannot be changed if they are duplicated. See Vindu Goel, That
Fingerprint Sensor on Your Phone Is Not as Safe as You Think, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/technology/fingerprint-security
-smartphones-apple-google-samsung.html [https://perma.cc/AG6Z-GTRX] (citing
research findings that “smartphones can easily be fooled by fake fingerprints digitally
composed of many common features found in human prints”).
81
See Uresk, supra note 78, at 604–05 (explaining that when the text stored on
a smartphone is encrypted, reading the text requires a complex decryption key that
is considered to be impervious to cracking; without the key, the text will appear
as unintelligible characters).
82
Joseph Cox, Cops Around the Country Can Now Unlock iPhones, Records Show,
VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 12, 2018, 12:52 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/
article/vbxxxd/unlock-iphone-ios11-graykey-grayshift-police [https://perma.cc/M93KN38K].
83
Uresk, supra note 78, at 611–12.
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III.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND THE MEANING OF
“TESTIMONY”
Law enforcement officers may be motivated to seize recording
devices for one of two purposes: to prevent the videographer from
recording what is happening or to use the recordings as evidence.
These two purposes implicate different legal and constitutional
doctrines. If the purpose of the seizure is to prevent the filming from
taking place, then the First Amendment may provide relief for the
device owner: six of the Nation’s twelve geographic Circuits have
stated that the act of filming police in public spaces with the intent
to disseminate the footage publicly is protected by the First
Amendment, and thus, police act unconstitutionally if they interdict
the filming or arrest the videographer.84 But, if police are not seeking
to prevent filming or destroy images for the purpose of preventing
publication but are instead confiscating smartphones for the purpose
of gathering evidence, a different legal analysis likely applies. This
Article focuses on the latter scenario, starting with the possible Fifth
Amendment defenses that might entitle a videographer to refuse a
demand to unlock a phone and make its recordings accessible.
In situations where the possessor of sought-after documentary
materials is not a criminal suspect, the Fifth Amendment will not be
an availing defense against compelled production of an unlocked
phone.85 However, in the often-chaotic setting of public
demonstrations, law enforcement does not always carefully

84

See Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 355 (3d Cir. 2017); Turner
v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 690 (5th Cir. 2017); ACLU v. Alvarez, 679
F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 85 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith
v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); Fordyce v. City of
Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 1995). More recently, the First Circuit extended
its Glik ruling to cover not just openly recording police, but also clandestinely
recording them. Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813, 833 (1st
Cir. 2020). In a pre-smartphone case that could have relevance to contemporary
confrontations over protest coverage, a federal district court found that the act of
seizing a TV news crew’s camera equipment and film constituted a forbidden
“prior restraint,” violating bedrock First Amendment doctrine. Channel 10, Inc.
v. Gunnarson, 337 F. Supp. 634, 637 (D. Minn. 1972).
85
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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differentiate between “a suspect” and “an observer.”86 Journalists
are often arrested alongside demonstrators on charges such as
trespass, disorderly conduct, obstruction, and failure to disperse.87 If
journalists themselves face charges and are confronted with a
demand for evidence, their first line of defense against compelled
production of an unlocked phone is the Fifth Amendment’s
provision against self-incrimination.88 The underlying principle of
this self-incrimination privilege is to require the government to
produce evidence against an individual through “the independent
labor of its officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it
from his own lips.”89 To qualify for the Fifth Amendment privilege,
a communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and
compelled.90 The primary issue regarding government-compelled
production of a passcode or biometric key is whether the act of
production is “testimonial” in nature.91
To be considered testimonial, an accused’s act “must itself,
explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose
information.”92 The Supreme Court has said that even the act of
selecting documents to comport with the demands of a subpoena can
qualify as testimonial, because that process communicates that the
person targeted by the subpoena is in possession of responsive and
86

See Sara Rafsky, At Occupy Protests, U.S. Journalists Arrested, Assaulted,
COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Nov. 11, 2011, 3:01 PM),
https://cpj.org/2011/11/at-occupy-protests-us-journalists-arrested-assault/
[https://perma.cc/5XFE-DPGG] (chronicling instances during a nationwide wave
of economic-justice protests “in which reporters and photographers were cuffed
and booked as police rounded up groups of protestors demonstrating in allegedly
unauthorized places”).
87
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, Police, Protesters, and the
Press, 2 (June 2020), https://www.rcfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/
06/Police-Protesters-Press-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZA2-8SHD].
88
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
89
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981).
90
Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004).
91
See Erin M. Sales, The “Biometric Revolution”: An Erosion of the Fifth
Amendment Privilege to Be Free From Self-Incrimination, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV.
193, 239 (2014) (concluding that the use of biometric authentication likely forfeits
Fifth Amendment protection if confronted with a demand to unlock the phone
because “an analysis of physical characteristics” will not qualify as “testimonial”).
92
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).
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authentic documents—comparable, in the Court’s view, to forcing a
homeowner to recite the combination to a wall safe.93 One court
recently illustrated the distinction between a testimonial and nontestimonial act: A person may not be compelled to acknowledge the
existence of an incriminating tattoo or describe its appearance, but a
person may be compelled to display the tattoo in court for the jury
because the latter is conduct and not testimony.94 By this standard,
the compelled production of an alphanumeric passcode is
testimonial, as the production requires a statement of fact and
reveals the contents of the speaker’s mind.95 This perspective is the
overwhelming consensus of the courts that have directly confronted
the issue of the nature of a smartphone passcode.96
One exception to compelled production being “testimonial” is
when the government can prove that the testimonial aspect of the
production is a “foregone conclusion.”97 For example, where a
suspect has already voluntarily entered the passcode in the presence
of law enforcement, “the testimonial value of compelling the
passcode’s production a second time is negligible,” and the
93

United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36 (2000).
State v. Pittman, 479 P.3d 1028, 1039 (Or. 2021) (en banc).
95
See Herrera, supra note 79, at 799 (collecting cases and concluding that
“disclosing a smartphone password – numeric or alphanumeric – is a testimonial
communication which falls under the protection of the Self-Incrimination
Clause”).
96
See State v. Johnson, 576 S.W.3d 205, 225 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019) (“In
jurisdictions that have addressed this issue, the majority of cases have determined
that this act of production is, in fact, a testimonial act.”); accord State v. Valdez,
482 P.3d 861, 875 (Utah Ct. App. 2021); Pollard v. State, 287 So. 3d 649, 657
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019); State v. Trant, No. CUMCDCR201502389, 2015 WL
7575496, at *2 (D. Me. Oct. 27, 2015); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Huang, No. 15269, 2015 WL 5611644, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2015); Commonwealth v. Baust,
No. CR14–1439, 2014 WL 10355635, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 28, 2014). In a rare
deviation from the consensus, a Florida appellate court decided that the act of
divulging a passcode was not testimonial, in part driven by the policy
consideration that using a fingerprint to unlock the same device would also not be
testimonial, and the appellate court “[was] not inclined to believe that the Fifth
Amendment should provide greater protection to individuals who passcode
protect their iPhones with letter and number combinations than to individuals who
use their fingerprint as the passcode.” State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 135 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
97
Pollard, 287 So. 3d at 653, 656.
94
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“foregone conclusion” exception would permit compelled
production.98 Thus, compelled production of a passcode is
permissible when doing so communicates no new information to the
government.99
However, even when the government can prove that the suspect
knows the passcode, some courts are hesitant to apply the “foregone
conclusion” exception to the compelled production of an unlocked
smartphone unless the government can show even more. In Eunjoo
Seo v. State, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that the government
needed to show that the defendant knew the password, that the data
files existed on the device, and that the defendant possessed those
files.100 According to the court, this additional information implicitly
conveyed to the police that the defendant’s compelled production of
the passcode was a foregone conclusion.101 Thus, although “the
communicative aspects of the production [fell] within the Fifth
Amendment’s protection,” the government overcame that protection
because the government showed that the government already knew
the defendant possessed and could access the smartphone.102 The
court in Eunjoo Seo was concerned with extending the “foregone
conclusion” exception, reasoning that compelled production of an
unlocked smartphone, unlike the production of specific documents,
“gives the government access to everything on the device, not just
those files it can identify with ‘reasonable particularity.’”103 As
such, the court cautioned against extending the foregone conclusion
exception in a way that would give the government such unfettered
access.104
Less than two months later, however, the New Jersey Supreme
Court permitted the compelled production of an alphanumeric
98

Id.
Id.; see also Pittman, 479 P.3d at 1046 (holding that a warrant can validly
compel unlocking of suspect’s password-protected smartphone only if law
enforcement already knows the “testimonial aspects of the act” of unlocking and
if the suspect is given immunity from the use of those testimonial acts as
evidence).
100
Eunjoo Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952, 958 (Ind. 2020).
101
Id. at 956.
102
Id. at 957–58.
103
Id. at 960.
104
Id.
99
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passcode under the “foregone conclusion” exception.105 The court
found that the State’s demonstration of the passcode’s existence, the
suspect’s previous possession and operation of the smartphone, and
the passcode’s self-authenticating nature, made the production of
the unlocked smartphone an issue of surrender, not testimony.106
The court took issue with the analysis in Eunjoo Seo, asserting that
the Eunjoo Seo court introduced “Fourth Amendment privacy
principles into a Fifth Amendment inquiry” by focusing its analysis
on the content to which the government gains access rather than the
act of production itself.107
The law is even less clear regarding the government’s ability to
compel production of a biometric key (e.g., a finger-press or facial
recognition) for the purposes of unlocking a suspect’s smartphone.
Most modern smartphones permit the use of both alphanumeric
passcodes and biometric keys for encryption; however, not all courts
treat these two security features the same for Fifth Amendment
purposes. In the limited case law interpreting this issue, two
prevailing philosophies have emerged.
The first philosophy is that a biometric key is functionally the
same as a passcode, and therefore, if a passcode is testimonial, so
too is a biometric key.108 In United States v. Wright,109 a federal
district court in Nevada reasoned that, by producing a biometric key
that unlocks a smartphone, a suspect is essentially testifying that the
suspect has unlocked the phone before (at least at a minimum, to set
up the biometric capabilities) and has “some level of control over
the phone” and its contents.110 Courts that subscribe to this

105

State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254, 1275 (N.J. 2020).
Id.
107
Id. at 17; see also State v. Johnson, 576 S.W.3d 205, 227 (Mo. Ct. App.
2019) (collecting cases that have taken varying views of what it means for
disclosure to be a “foregone conclusion” and concluding that the focus must be
on the state’s knowledge of the information that the state is attempting to
compel—that is, the passcode itself—rather than the state’s knowledge of the
contents of any particular file on the device).
108
United States v. Wright, 431 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Nev. 2020).
109
Id. at 1175.
110
Id. at 1187.
106
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philosophy find production of a biometric key to be a testimonial act
privileged by the Fifth Amendment.111
The alternative, second philosophy in case law, and the
predominant view currently, rejects the idea that a biometric key is
testimonial simply by serving the same purpose as a passcode,
reasoning that their “functional equivalency” does not amount to a
“legal equivalency.”112 In July 2020, a federal district court in
Kentucky found that, because a biometric key could be produced
“without any mental impressions, communication, or admission of
mens rea from the target,” such a compelled act could not be
testimonial.113 Thus, the court determined that a compelled physical
act, which requires no revelation of information stored in a person’s
mind, is not testimonial.114 Courts that subscribe to this point of
view have determined that compelled production of a biometric
feature to unlock a smartphone is no different than other compelled
physical acts that have been upheld as non-testimonial, such as
undergoing blood tests, providing handwriting and voice exemplars,
or trying on a garment.115
111

See e.g., In re Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1014 (N.D. Cal.
2019) (finding that the compelled production of biometric key was testimonial in
the context of a warrant application seeking to unlock a device); In re Application
for Search Warrant, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1067 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (finding that the
compelled production of a fingerprint to unlock a smartphone was testimonial
where accessing the smartphone via that fingerprint would communicate that the
defendant exercised significant control over the phone and its contents).
112
In re Search Warrant No. 5165, 470 F. Supp. 3d 715, 734 (E.D. Ky. 2020);
see also Redfern, supra note 80, at 600 (“The majority of courts that have
addressed the constitutional issue posed by biometric passwords have determined
that the Fifth Amendment does not protect individuals against compelled
biometric decryption.”).
113
In re Search Warrant No. 5165, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 729.
114
Id. at 730.
115
See e.g., State v. Diamond, 905 N.W.2d 870, 877 (Minn. 2018) (holding that
a finger-press on a smartphone screen cannot be considered “testimonial” for Fifth
Amendment purposes because a defendant does not have to engage in any mental
processes to trigger the unlocking, and indeed, a defendant could even be
unconscious); In re Search Warrant Application for Cellular Telephone v.
Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d 832, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (finding that compelling
production of a biometric feature is no different than other compelled physical
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The Eastern District of Kentucky further emphasized that even
when the production of a biometric feature is both compelled and
incriminating, the production of the biometric feature is not
necessarily testimonial.116 The court recognized that the use of
biometrics might lead to incriminating evidence but ultimately held
that the State did not violate the Fifth Amendment because the State
would still be required to locate the incriminating evidence and
prove its authenticity.117 Since multiple individuals may have access
to a device, and since files may exist on a device without an
individual’s knowledge or intent, “the government may still have to
prove possession of the contents of the device as well as the mens
rea connected to [the alleged] crimes.”118 Thus, the compelled
production of “an immutable physical characteristic” to access a
smartphone would not be testimonial where the State would still
need to authenticate any incriminating evidence revealed by the act
of production.119
In summary, unless the government can prove that an individual
knows a device's passcode, the government’s compelling of a
suspect to produce a passcode is widely believed to violate the Fifth
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.120 However,
some courts have inferred knowledge of a passcode from a suspect’s
mere possession and operation of a passcode-protected phone.121
For this reason, a videographer should avoid entering a passcode
into a phone within view of law enforcement agents, as at least some
courts will consider that act to render the re-disclosure of the
acts that have been upheld as non-testimonial); In re Search of [Redacted] Wash.,
D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 527 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding the compelled production
of a biometric feature are akin to other compelled uses of physical characteristics
that courts have found non-testimonial even when the produced information
would be used for investigatory rather than identification purposes).
116
In re Search Warrant No. 5165, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 729.
117
Id. at 734.
118
Id.
119
Id.; see also Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 833 (finding that a defendant’s
ability to unlock a phone was not dispositive of guilt since phones can be
programmed to accommodate multiple users; therefore, the compelled production
is not testimonial or incriminating in and of itself).
120
Pollard v. State, 287 So. 3d 649, 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
121
State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254, 1275 (N.J. 2020).
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passcode a “foregone conclusion,” eliminating the constitutional
protection of the smartphone’s contents.
In contrast with numeric or alphanumeric passcodes, a majority
of courts hearing the issue have found that a biometric key is not
testimonial and therefore not privileged under the Fifth
Amendment.122 The distinction is best illustrated by a Virginia trial
court’s ruling in the afore-cited Baust case, where police ordered the
suspect in an assault case to unlock his phone so that the police could
see whether a video of the attack existed on the device, as believed
by the assault victim.123 The phone could be unlocked either by way
of an alphanumeric passcode or by a fingerprint; the defendant
invoked the Fifth Amendment as to both methods, but the court
found that only the passcode, and not the fingerprint, qualified as
testimonial, implicating the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights.124
The Supreme Court has yet to speak to the issue, so trial courts
provide much of the available authority. Currently, an individual is
afforded more predictable and consistent Fifth Amendment
protection by encrypting their phone with an alphanumeric passcode
than with a biometric key.
Despite the current thrust of case law, policy interests may
eventually give way to a different outcome—and with good reason.
In the case of In re Search Warrant No. 5165,125 a district court
lamented being without authoritative guidance “in the unmapped
territory where old law and new technology intersect” and
recognized that emerging law would need to play “catch up” with
technology.126 Reaching a similar conclusion, a district court for the
District of Columbia acknowledged that, as a lower court, its duty
to faithfully interpret and apply Supreme Court precedent
outweighed the important privacy interests at stake.127
122

In re Search Warrant No. 5165, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 729.
Commonwealth v. Baust, No. CR14–1439, 2014 WL 10355635, at *1 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Oct. 28, 2014); see supra note 96.
124
See id. at *4 (“In this case, the Defendant cannot be compelled to produce
his passcode to access his smartphone, but he can be compelled to produce his
fingerprint to do the same.”).
125
In re Search Warrant No. 5165, 470 F. Supp. 3d 715 (E.D. Ky. 2020).
126
Id. at 735.
127
In re Search of [Redacted] Wash., D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 540 (D.D.C. 2018).
123
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In its 2014 decision in Riley v. California,128 the Supreme Court
may have signaled its position if presented with the issue of
compelled production of a passcode or biometric feature to access
the contents of a smartphone. In Riley, Chief Justice John Roberts
emphasized that the capacity of modern cellphones to hold “the
privacies of life” made their search and seizure uniquely intrusive
and thus required a warrant.129 This recognition of the immense
capacity for smartphones to store intimate data could prompt the
Supreme Court to find that production of a passcode or biometric
feature for the purposes of unlocking a smartphone is a testimonial
act—and therefore privileged by the Fifth Amendment. As one
commentator has argued, smartphones are now “an extension of the
self,” so that the privacy considerations implicated by a search are
even more profound than in traditional searches of physical spaces
around which constitutional doctrine developed: “It is no longer
workable to separate the action of decryption from the person,
especially considering the person is now the means of
decryption.”130
IV.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: WHAT IS WARRANTED?
Even when compelled production of an unlocked smartphone is
permissible, the Fourth Amendment provides an additional layer of
protection against government search and seizure. The Fourth
Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”131 The “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
‘reasonableness,’” and—except for a few recognized categories of
exigent situations—reasonableness normally requires law
enforcement agencies to obtain a search warrant from a neutral
magistrate after demonstrating probable cause to believe that the

128

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
Id. at 403.
130
Redfern, supra note 80, at 627–28.
131
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
129
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place to be searched contains evidence of a crime.132 When a search
warrant sufficiently states probable cause for the search and seizure
of an electronic device, law enforcement may either access the
device if the device is unlocked or attempt brute force efforts to gain
entry into the device.133 However, the critical inquiry in this context
is under what circumstances law enforcement agents can compel
individuals to produce a passcode or biometric feature to gain access
to a device.
The taking of a fingerprint constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment.134 In Hayes v. Florida, the Supreme Court set forth
criteria to justify obtaining fingerprints from an individual, requiring
that (1) the government had reasonable suspicion that the suspect
committed a crime, (2) the government reasonably believed that
fingerprinting would establish or negate the suspect’s connection
with that crime, and (3) the procedure was carried out with
dispatch.135 Several courts have applied this standard in determining
whether the government may compel the use of an individual’s
biometric features to unlock a device during the execution of a
search warrant.136
While taking a fingerprint is considered a search under the
Fourth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment status of a facial scan
remains an open question. If scanning facial features is not
considered a search, then no warrant is required.137 This conclusion
is logical since a person’s outward appearance, particularly when
attending a protest or other form of public gathering, can freely be
132

Emmanuel Abraham Perea Jimenez, The Fourth Amendment Limits of
Facial Recognition at the Border, 70 DUKE L.J. 1837, 1856 (2021) (quoting Riley
v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014)).
133
In re Search Warrant No. 5165, 470 F. Supp. 3d 715, 725 (E.D. Ky. 2020).
134
Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816–17 (1985).
135
Id. at 817.
136
See In re Search of [Redacted] Wash., D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 526
(D.D.C. 2018); see, e.g., In re Search Warrant No. 5165, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 725
(applying the three-pronged standard from Hayes to determine the legality of a
biometric request during a search warrant).
137
For simplicity, and in the absence of a conclusive consensus on the status of
facial scanning, the remainder of this Article refers to fingerprinting and facial
scanning collectively as the compelled production of biometric features, on the
assumption that Fourth Amendment safeguards will apply.
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observed by anyone—including police—without intruding on any
reasonable expectation of privacy.138 But this inference does not
necessarily extend to ordering a smartphone owner to hand over a
phone and hold still while the phone is held up to the owner’s face
for unlocking. Courts have taken a somewhat more nuanced
approach to the “expectation of privacy in public” (or lack thereof)
since the Supreme Court’s Carpenter v. United States decision.139
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court held that the “pings” on cellphone
towers, which can be used to piece together a smartphone user’s
movements, implicate constitutionally protected privacy
interests.140 Thus, the act of exposing one’s face to a crowd of
demonstrators does not logically translate to the conclusion that the
expectation of privacy is waived for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment’s search and seizure doctrine.
Even if police must obtain a search warrant, and the warrant is
authorized, compelling a smartphone owner to unlock the device

138

See Elizabeth Snyder, “Faceprints” and the Fourth Amendment: How the
FBI Uses Facial Recognition Technology to Conduct Unlawful Searches, 68
SYRACUSE L. REV. 255, 261 (2018) (“The limited number of courts that have
considered the applicability of Fourth Amendment protections to photographs
have largely declined to find a search where a camera captures that which an
individual publishes to the public.”). Snyder argues that, although Fourth
Amendment precedent is “bleak” for convincing a court that a search to run a
person’s lawfully-obtained photo through a database for matching to a suspected
criminal is unlawful, there should be a recognized privacy interest in that
transaction because exposing one’s face for purposes of a photo does not
necessarily imply anticipation of—much less consent to—the biometric analysis
of that photo by the government. See id. at 260–63.
139
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
140
Id. at 2216–17; see, e.g., Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Balt. Police
Dep’t, 2 F.4th 330, 341 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (citing Carpenter for the
proposition that the reasonable expectation of privacy can be violated by
“prolonged tracking that can reveal intimate details through habits and patterns”
and holding that plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction against police
aerial surveillance program); see also Matthew Doktor, Facial Recognition and
the Fourth Amendment in the Wake of Carpenter v. United States, 89 U. CIN. L.
REV. 552, 568 (2021) (arguing that, just as with the cellphone locational data at
issue in Carpenter, “facial recognition scans of biometric data intrude into a
sphere of privacy that merits protection through the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement”).
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may occur only in the manner authorized by the search warrant.141
In United States v. Maffei, a prosecutor compelled a defendant to
convey the alphanumeric passcode of his phone; however, the
warrant provided only the authority to compel production of a
biometric key.142 The court found that obtaining the defendant’s
passcode rather than a biometric key, constituted materially
different conduct and, as such, found that the prosecutor’s conduct
exceeded the scope of the warrant.143
The government need not state with specificity the exact devices
the government seeks to compel a suspect to unlock.144 In In re
Search of [Redacted] Washington, D.C.,145 a warrant sought access
to “any digital device which [was] capable of containing and
reasonably could contain fruits, evidence, information, contraband,
or instrumentalities as described in the search warrant . . . .”146 The
court held that, so long as the government has a “reasonable
suspicion that the individual’s biometric features will unlock the
device,” the suspect may be compelled to produce a biometric
feature for that device.147 Thus, the government may compel
production of a biometric key to unlock any device found on the
premises that could reasonably be connected to that individual and
the alleged criminal offense, as long as the procedure is carried out
promptly and only against the individual subject to the warrant.148
The subject of the search warrant need not be a suspect of the
crime for the Fourth Amendment to attach.149 In Zurcher, police
141
United States v. Maffei, No. 18–SW–0122 (GMH), 2019 WL 1864712, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2019).
142
Id. at *4.
143
Id. at *5.
144
In re Search of [Redacted] Wash., D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 526 (D.D.C.
2018).
145
317 F. Supp. 3d 523 (D.D.C. 2018).
146
Id. at 526.
147
Id. at 533.
148
Id.; see also In re Search Warrant No. 5165, 470 F. Supp. 3d 715, 725 (E.D.
Ky. 2020) (finding that the government may compel an individual’s biometrics if
there exists reasonable suspicion that (1) the individual has committed a criminal
act for which the warrant authorizes an evidentiary search, and (2) the individual’s
biometric features will unlock the device).
149
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559 (1978).

DEC. 2021]

Smartphone Security

251

executed a search warrant of the Stanford Daily, an undergraduate
student newspaper, under the suspicion that the newspaper
possessed photographs documenting violence against police during
a demonstration.150 The newspaper filed a civil action, claiming that
the search warrant deprived the journalists of their constitutional
rights.151 When the case made it to the Supreme Court, the Court
agreed that the Fourth Amendment applied to the newsroom search
but ultimately found no constitutional violation in the search
because the search was “reasonable.”152 The reasonableness of the
search warrant turned on whether there was reason to believe that
evidence might be located on an individual’s property (and there
was reason to believe the Stanford Daily had evidence “on” its
newsroom), not whether the individual being searched was
criminally liable.153
However, the government may not broadly compel production
from any or all individuals present on the premises that is the subject
of a search warrant.154 In In re Application for Search Warrant, the
government sought authority to compel any individual present at the
premises at the time of the search to provide biometrics onto any
Apple device.155 The court denied the search warrant application
because the warrant was “neither limited to a particular person nor
a particular device.”156 However, the court did determine that, in
some instances, the government may temporarily detain individuals
not subject to a warrant if the individuals are occupants of the
premises being searched, but this authority did not extend to
individuals who were merely present but not otherwise connected to
the premises.157
To complicate the analysis, the Supreme Court has given police
considerable latitude to conduct what is known as a “search incident
150

See id. at 551.
Id. at 552.
152
See id. at 567–68.
153
Id. at 555–56.
154
See e.g., In re Application for a Search Warrant, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1067
(N.D. Ill. 2017).
155
Id. at 1067.
156
Id. at 1068.
157
See id. at 1069–70.
151
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to arrest” without a warrant. In Chimel v. California,158 the Supreme
Court gave its clearest guidance on the “search incident to arrest”
doctrine and its limits, holding that, in the course of making a lawful
arrest, police may conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee’s
person and any areas within the arrestee’s reach or immediate
control.159 The Supreme Court’s recognition of a workaround to the
warrant requirement pursuant to the Fourth Amendment rested on
two justifications: (1) the arrestee might grab and use a weapon, or
(2) the arrestee might destroy evidence of a crime.160 The “weapon”
rationale plainly has no application to seizing and searching a
journalist’s phone, but police might argue that the “destruction”
rationale does apply, if the journalist is being arrested and accused
of a crime.
Finally, and notably, the ability to unlock a phone does not
necessarily imply that police may freely review all of the phone’s
contents. Police may search only in places where the evidence they
are authorized to seek might reasonably be found.161 For instance,
in the physical rather than digital world, a warrant authorizing police
to search a house for a homeowner’s shotgun would not authorize
the opening of letters in the homeowner’s mailbox.162 In the context
of a journalist’s smartphone, an authorized search for video footage
of people damaging property would not license police to also read

158

395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Id. at 762–63.
160
See id.
161
See, e.g., United States v. Pritchard, 745 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th Cir. 1984)
(“[A] search for small electronic devices justifies entry into containers in which
they would fit and might reasonably be found.”).
162
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1968) (“[A] search which is
reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its
intolerable intensity and scope . . . . The scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied
to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.”)
(citations omitted); United States v. Foster, 100 F.3d 846, 850–51 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a warrant empowering police to search a home and barn for illegal
drugs and firearms did not also authorize them to confiscate everything else of
value on the premises, including the homeowner’s lawnmower, television sets,
clock radio, and other household items, on a mere suspicion that some of the items
might have been stolen).
159
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the journalist’s emails.163 Unlocking a secured smartphone, then, is
not an all-or-nothing proposition, as an otherwise lawful search can
ripen into a Fourth Amendment violation if the search exceeds its
permissible scope.
In summary, the government can compel production of a
biometric key from individuals that the government reasonably
suspects either committed, or possess evidence of, the criminal act
that is the subject matter of the warrant.164 The compelled
production may be carried out on devices subject to the warrant that
the government has reasonable suspicion to believe the individual’s
biometric features will unlock.165 The procedure must be carried out
“with dispatch and in the immediate vicinity of the premises to be
searched.”166 Additionally, the government may compel an
individual to unlock a phone only in the manner authorized by the
search warrant.167 Thus, anyone in possession of sought-after
documentary materials, who is not the subject of a search warrant,
is under no obligation to produce an unlocked device for law
enforcement.
V.

THE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT AND THE “NEWSROOM”
IN AMERICA’S POCKET
While the privileges afforded by the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments extend to all citizens, the Privacy Protection Act of
1980168 (“PPA”) may provide an additional layer of protection for
journalists and others gathering information to inform the public.
Congress enacted the PPA as a direct response to the Supreme
Court’s resolution in the aforementioned Zurcher case, in which the
163

See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010)
(recognizing that the Fourth Amendment applies to a police search of the contents
of an email account because the accountholder has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in emails, notwithstanding the fact that the account can be accessed by
the company that issued the email account).
164
See In re Search of [Redacted] Wash., D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 533
(D.D.C. 2018).
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
See United States v. Maffei, No. 18–SW–0122 (GMH), 2019 WL 1864712,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2019).
168
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1980).
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Justices found no actionable constitutional violation when police
raided a college newspaper’s office pursuant to a judicially-issued
search warrant, whereby the police confiscated cameras to search
for unpublished photos.169 Thus, while the direct inspiration for the
PPA stemmed from the search of a newsroom, and the Act is
sometimes colloquially referred to as a “newsroom search law,”170
the application of its broad protections could readily extend to the
memory card of a journalist’s smartphone.
In short, the PPA prohibits a government officer or employee
from seizing any unpublished work product or documentary
materials possessed by an individual who intends to disseminate the
material to the public.171 While such materials may be obtained by
lawful means, “such as [by] grand jury subpoenas and voluntary
requests,” these lawful means provide an individual the opportunity
to immediately object and possibly assert legally recognized
grounds for refusing to comply, such as privilege.172 A surprise raid
of a newsroom—or the snatch of a smartphone from a journalist’s
hand—provides no such opportunity.
The PPA’s text provides a somewhat greater degree of
protection for “work product” materials as opposed to non-workproduct “documentary materials.”173 For purposes of a smartphone
169

Elizabeth B. Uzelac, Reviving the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 107 NW.
U. L. REV. 1437, 1442–43 (2013).
170
See, e.g., Declan McCullagh & Greg Sandoval, Journalist Shield Law May
Not Halt iPhone Probe, CNET.COM (Apr. 27, 2010, 10:43 AM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/journalist-shield-law-may-not-halt-iphone-probe/
[https://perma.cc/89H8-8A75] (referring to the PPA as a “federal newsroom
search law” in the context of a police investigation into how journalists obtained
a prototype iPhone before its public release).
171
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a)–(b).
172
Sennett v. United States, 778 F. Supp. 2d 655, 662 (E.D. Va. 2011), aff’d,
667 F.3d 531 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Bryan R. Kelly, #PrivacyProtection: How
the United States Can Get Its Head Out of the Sand and Into the Clouds to Secure
Fourth Amendment Protections for Cloud Journalists, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 669,
690 (2016) (explaining that the PPA “creates a substantial protection for
journalists by ensuring their day in court before the government may seize any
materials”).
173
See Uzelac, supra note 169, at 1445 (explaining that additional statutory
exceptions allow search or seizure when materials do not qualify as “work
product”).
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search, the bulk of materials for which a police officer might search
(such as photos and videos, or recordings of audio interviews)
should qualify as work product.
For the PPA to apply, government officials must have reason to
believe that the targeted individual has “a purpose to disseminate”
the seized materials “to the public.”174 “[W]earing press credentials,
. . . carrying a video camera, and identif[ying] [one]self as ‘media’”
are sufficient to put government officials on notice of such an
intent.175 Importantly, protection under the PPA turns on the
individual’s intent to disseminate the materials to the public and not
on whether the individual is a professional journalist.176 Further,
while the government must be on notice of the targeted individual’s
intent to disseminate, “the PPA does not require” an individual to
make “an express statement of intent” to that effect.177
Notably, courts have recognized some exceptions to the
privileges afforded by the PPA. The “suspect exception” permits the
seizure of work product or documentary materials when police have
“probable cause to believe that the person possessing such materials
has committed or is committing the criminal offense to which the
materials relate.”178 Thus, this exception overrides the protection
afforded to an individual’s work product and documentary materials
under the PPA.179 In Sennett v. United States, law enforcement
officers searched Sennett’s residence and seized hard drives,
computers, cameras, and memory cards that Sennett asserted were
professional work product.180 The court found that the “suspect
174

42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a).
Benjamin v. Peterson, No. 12–220, 2013 WL 3097271, at *6 (D. Minn. June
18, 2013).
176
Basler v. Barron, No. H–15–2254, 2017 WL 477573, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
6, 2017); see also Uzelac, supra note 169, at 1439 (“Since 1980, the pool of those
potentially covered by the Act has increased dramatically as a result of changes
in the information industry . . . . [G]iven the dramatic expansion of digital
publishing and home computer usage, the Act might now in fact protect any
person who publishes online.”).
177
Garcia v. Montgomery Cnty., 145 F. Supp. 3d 492, 524 (D. Md. 2015).
178
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a)(1), (b)(1).
179
See Sennett v. United States, 778 F. Supp. 2d 655, 656 (E.D. Va. 2011),
aff’d, 667 F.3d 531 (4th Cir. 2012).
180
See id. at 658–59.
175
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exception” applied because there was probable cause to believe that
Sennett had vandalized the Four Seasons Hotel, and the subsequent
search of the suspect’s apartment related to that investigation.181
Sennett claimed to have been documenting the unrest that unfolded
at the hotel as a professional photojournalist.182 However, the court
found that the fact that Sennett arrived at the hotel “within seconds
of the vandals,” wore clothing and a backpack similar to that of the
vandals, and fled the hotel along with the vandals, collectively
amounted to a reasonable suspicion that Sennett was a member of
the vandal group.183 As such, the court found that Sennett’s claim of
being present only as a photojournalist merely provided “[t]he
possibility of an innocent explanation [that did] not vitiate properly
established probable cause.”184 In sum, because the court found
probable cause that Sennett participated in the vandalism, and
because the seized property related to that offense, Sennett’s PPA
claim was barred by the “suspect exception.”185
Illustrating the differing protections for journalistic work
product versus non-work-product, an additional statutory exemption
permits the seizure of documentary materials (though not deemed
“work product”) when the advance warning of a subpoena “would
result in the destruction, alteration, or concealment of such
materials.”186 This exception permits police to confiscate
documentary evidence, even from people who would otherwise
181

See id.
See id. at 663.
183
Id. at 663–64.
184
Id. at 665 (quoting United States v. Booker, 612 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir.
2010)).
185
Id. at 667. In another recent application of the “suspect” exemption, a federal
district court dismissed a PPA claim brought by the operator of a parody Facebook
page whose home was searched by the police department that was the target of
his mockery. See Novak v. City of Parma, No. 1:17-CV-2148, 2021 WL 720458,
at *1, *17 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2021). Whether a social media page qualifies for
the protection under the PPA was not at issue; the issue was whether police could
claim the benefit of the “suspect” exemption because they had a judicially issued
warrant to arrest the critic for violating an Ohio statute, making it a crime to
interfere with the operations of a law enforcement agency. See id. at *6, *17. The
court found that the exemption applied. See id. at *17.
186
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(b)(3).
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qualify for PPA protection, without a warrant or hearing.187 In
Berglund v. City of Maplewood, plaintiffs Berglund and Zick, hosts
of a public-access television show, attended a local banquet with the
intent of videotaping the event for a broadcast.188 An altercation
ensued involving the plaintiffs, which resulted in Berglund being
charged with disorderly conduct and obstruction.189 Berglund had
operated the video camera throughout the altercation.190 After
Berglund’s arrest, police seized the camera from Zick and
confiscated the videotape without a warrant.191 Citing the
“‘destruction of evidence’ exception,” the court found that “an
objectively reasonable officer would have reason to believe that
Zick . . . would erase or tamper with the videotape that provided
evidence of Berglund’s conduct.”192 As such, the “destruction of
evidence” exception permitted the warrantless seizure of the
incriminating documentary material.193
The PPA includes two additional exceptions. The “emergency
exception” permits seizure of work product and documentary
materials when law enforcement has a reason to believe that
immediate seizure “is necessary to prevent the death of, or serious
bodily injury to, a human being.”194 The final exception permits
seizure of documentary materials when the targeted individual has
failed to produce materials in compliance with a subpoena and
where any further delay in the investigation or trial would “threaten
the interests of justice.”195 When the government seeks a search
warrant under this exception, however, a journalist must be afforded
an “opportunity to submit an affidavit setting forth the basis for any
contention that the materials sought are not subject to seizure.”196
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See Berglund v. City of Maplewood, 173 F. Supp. 2d 935, 944 (D. Minn.
2001), aff’d sub nom. Zick v. City of Maplewood, 50 F. App’x 805 (8th Cir. 2002).
188
Id. at 940.
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Id. at 940–41.
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Id. at 941.
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Id.
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Berglund, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 949.
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Id. at 949.
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42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a)(2), (b)(2).
195
Id. § 2000aa(b)(4)(B).
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Id. § 2000aa(c).
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Two murky areas of the PPA are worth noting, both relating to
the government accidentally obtaining otherwise-PPA-protected
materials. The first is when the government incidentally seizes PPAprotected materials that are commingled with criminal evidence.197
For example, in Guest v. Leis, the user of an electronic bulletin board
system (“EBBS”) sued the government after the government
confiscated and searched his computer server in an obscenity
investigation, asserting that the seizure of certain electronic files
violated the PPA.198 The court found no liability under the PPA
since the “protected materials [were] commingled on a criminal
suspect’s computer with criminal evidence that [was] unprotected
by the act.”199 The court stressed, however, that the government may
not search any protected materials that the government incidentally
seizes.200
The second murky area is when the government incidentally
seizes PPA-protected materials from an individual who is not
suspected of a crime to which those materials relate.201 In Steve
Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, Jackson operated an
EBBS for the purpose of publishing articles and information about
197

Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 342 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id. Although the Guest case ended with a decision in favor of the law
enforcement agency, the case is noteworthy for recognizing standing for people
who were not themselves publishers but who had furnished material to a publisher
for purposes of dissemination. See id. at 341 (noting that the PPA is not limited to
publishers but rather furnishes a cause of action to “[a] person aggrieved by a
search for or seizure of materials” covered by the Act). The Guest ruling suggests
that a person who is, for instance, a source who gives an interview to a journalist
should be able to bring a claim over an unlawful search or seizure of the records
of that interview, even if the journalist chooses not to bring a claim. This
determination overrides the normal presumption that a person relinquishes any
reasonable expectation of privacy and loses the ability to bring a constitutional
challenge to a search, by voluntarily sharing information with third parties. See
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held repeatedly
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if
the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”).
201
See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D.
Tex. 1993).
198
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his company’s products.202 Jackson’s computer was seized during
an investigation into a separate EBBS operated by one of his
employees.203 At no point was Jackson suspected of any criminal
wrongdoing.204 The government agents who seized the property
claimed to be unaware of Jackson’s publisher status and were thus
unaware that seizing the computer might violate the PPA.205 The
court concluded that the government’s retention of the computer,
after learning of Jackson’s publisher status, amounted to a violation
of the PPA.206 Importantly, the court seemed to leave open the idea
that the government could have avoided liability under the PPA by
making copies of all the materials seized and returning the hardware
to Jackson upon learning of his publisher status.207 The court’s
suggested workaround would greatly undermine the heightened
protections afforded to work product of those who are not suspects
of criminal wrongdoing, though there is so far no indication that
other courts are adopting this workaround.
The PPA closes significant gaps in constitutional law that would
otherwise leave journalists’ work product vulnerable to examination
and use by law enforcement in ways that might harm confidential
sources.208 While police sometimes seek to inspect, and even
destroy, the contents of smartphones on the scene where news is
happening,209 police also sometimes confiscate phones for later
202

Id. at 434.
Id. at 436.
204
Id. at 435.
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Id. at 436.
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Id. at 441.
207
Id.
208
See Uzelac, supra note 169, at 1459 (noting that the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments offer little protection if one’s documents are in the possession of
third parties).
209
See Kiara Alfonseca, Philadelphia Officer Investigated for Allegedly
Deleting Suspect’s Cellphone Video of Arrest, ABC NEWS (June 10, 2021),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/philadelphia-officer-investigated-allegedly-deleting-suspects
-cell-phone/story?id=78195441 [https://perma.cc/Z4JN-7W46] (reporting on the
internal investigation of a police officer seen on body-cam video apparently
deleting the recording of a traffic stop from the motorist’s cellphone); Angie
Jackson, Can Police Order Citizens to Delete Video of Officers? Experts Weigh
in,
MLIVE
(Apr.
12,
2016),
https://www.mlive.com/news/grand203
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examination. In the latter scenario, absent the PPA, a journalist’s
newsgathering materials would be vulnerable to compromise if—as
is increasingly the case—police succeed in cracking the phone’s
security without the owner’s cooperation, bypassing the
constitutional protections that would have enabled the owner to
refuse to unlock it.210 If, however, police obey the strictures of the
PPA, then police will not confiscate journalists’ phones or attempt
to look at the content of phones without the benefit of a court
proceeding.
In summary, the PPA protects work product and documentary
materials produced in anticipation of public dissemination from
seizure by government officials.211 The PPA applies if government
officials reasonably believe the seized materials were possessed by
an individual intending to distribute information to the public.212
The PPA does not apply when police have probable cause to believe
that the person possessing the sought-after materials has committed
the criminal offense to which the materials relate.213 Nor does the
PPA apply when notice of a subpoena would result in the
destruction, alteration, or concealment of the material.214
rapids/2016/04/can_police_order_citizens_to_d.html [https://perma.cc/GZV687BQ] (reporting on a lawsuit over a 2014 arrest in Grand Rapids, Michigan, in
which bystanders filming the suspect’s struggle with police were ordered to delete
their images “for the safety of the undercover officers”); Timothy B. Lee,
Journalist Recovers Video of His Arrest After Police Deleted It, ARS TECHNICA
(Feb. 6, 2012), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/02/journalist-recoversvideo-of-his-arrest-after-police-deleted-it/
[https://perma.cc/5SSE-X6C5]
(describing how, after being arrested while covering “Occupy Wall Street”
protests in Miami, Florida, a photojournalist found that several videos were erased
from his camera memory while the camera was in police custody).
210
See Lily Hay Newman, How Law Enforcement Gets Around Your
Smartphone’s Encryption, WIRED (Jan. 13, 2021, 1:01 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/smartphone-encryption-law-enforcement-tools/
[https://perma.cc/BDD6-XQ7E] (reporting that “new research indicates
governments already have methods and tools that, for better or worse, let them
access locked smartphones thanks to weaknesses in the security schemes of
Android and iOS”).
211
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a)–(b).
212
Id.
213
Id. § 2000aa(a)(1), (b)(1).
214
Id. § 2000aa(b)(3).
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VI.
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SMARTPHONE NEWSGATHERING
Those who document protests where clashes with police are
foreseeable (either as professional journalists or as citizen
observers) should anticipate demands for the handing over of their
devices by police and be prepared to respond. With regard to the
Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination, an
alphanumeric passcode is more consistently protected from
compelled production by law enforcement than a biometric key, and
both of these lock methods are far superior in terms of receiving
protection than a device with no encryption. With regard to the
Fourth Amendment, an individual is not required to produce a
biometric feature to unlock a device unless the individual is the
subject of a search warrant or is an occupant of the premises being
searched. Even if the government identifies an individual as the
subject of a warrant, oftentimes government agents must identify in
their warrant application the individual’s specific finger or biometric
feature that is to be applied to the device.215
While anyone “taking to the streets” enjoys the privileges
afforded by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, it is less clear who
might enjoy additional protection under the seldom-litigated PPA.
The PPA protects work product, not people. Specifically, the PPA
protects work product possessed by someone with the purpose of
disseminating “a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form
of public communication” to the public.216 While the language of the
PPA predates Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Reddit, these
platforms arguably represent similar forms of public
communication, rendering work product and documentary materials
destined for these platforms protected under the PPA. For those who
can show a history of using the platform in a way comparable to a
news blog (for instance, a person who maintains a Facebook page
about community news events), their work product would likely be

215

In re Search Warrant Application for [redacted text], 279 F. Supp. 3d 800,
803–04 (N.D. Ill. 2017); see also In re Search of [Redacted] Wash., D.C., 317 F.
Supp. 3d 523, 536 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that the procedure proposed by the
government for collection of the subject’s biometric features requires the
government to identify the exact finger to apply to the sensor).
216
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a) (emphasis added).
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protected.217 So, ostensibly, any civilian who records the events of a
protest with the purpose of posting the recording on a platform open
to the public could qualify for protection under the PPA, affording
the civilian the opportunity to object to any government effort to
obtain the documentary material.
A case before the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia recently tested the outer limits of this protection.218 In Dunn
v. City of Fort Valley, Dunn was a self-described citizen-journalist
who composed and distributed news-like videos on his YouTube
channel, which had more than 8,000 followers.219 While Dunn was
recording inside a municipal building, a law enforcement officer
seized Dunn’s video camera without his consent and arrested him.220
The court found no probable cause for Dunn’s arrest and thus found
his PPA claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.221
If 8,000 followers on YouTube is sufficient for an individual’s
documentary material to qualify for protection under the PPA, then
thousands of the citizen-journalists documenting the events in
Minneapolis, Portland, Chicago, and other cities across the United
States should be afforded similar protection for their work product.
The argument for this broad interpretation of the PPA to extend
beyond professional journalists becomes even stronger where, as is
often the case, law enforcement officials themselves are the focus of
the filming, as courts are increasingly recognizing a compelling
public interest in monitoring police doing official business in
publicly viewable places.222
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See, e.g., Simon Romero, La Gordiloca: The Swearing Muckraker Upending
Border Journalism, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
03/10/us/gordiloca-laredo-priscilla-villarreal.html
[https://perma.cc/JAW6QGUP] (describing an amateur watchdog journalist’s popular Facebook feed,
which provides citizens of Laredo, Texas, with coverage of police news,
comparable to what a community newspaper might offer).
218
See Dunn v. City of Fort Valley, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1354 (M.D. Ga.
2020).
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Id. at 1354–55.
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Id. at 1355–56.
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Id. at 1368.
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See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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Whether litigation under the PPA will increase as a result of
recent events, and whether courts will be willing to construe the
statute more broadly than the Middle District of Georgia, remain to
be seen. Nevertheless, individuals chronicling protests can take
steps to reduce the likelihood that documentary materials captured
on their phones will be seized by law enforcement. While there is
no requirement to affirmatively state one’s intention to disseminate
material publicly, making such intention clear puts law enforcement
on notice, as required to trigger the protection of the PPA. Further,
an individual who documents the criminal conduct of others should
seek to differentiate from the wrongdoers in both behavior and
appearance so as to minimize opportunities for the government to
establish probable cause. Finally, if a person possesses documentary
materials that relate to a crime for which the person is not a suspect,
the person should make all efforts to indicate an intent to retain and
preserve those materials until presented with a court order to turn
the materials over. Taking these steps can help journalists protect
their documentary material from unlawful search and seizure and
can serve the interests of justice in an age when smartphones are
documenting more potentially criminal activities than ever before.
VII. CONCLUSION
The public manifestly benefits when photographers and
videographers can discharge their role of eyewitness to unfolding
history. Not only do visual images make news coverage more
credible, but visual images also make news coverage more
accessible by increasing the ability of news stories to be shared,
reaching large audiences through social media.223 In the absence of
independent news coverage by civilian reporters, government
agencies increasingly use online channels to distribute their own
images, which can be selectively edited to portray a deceptively

223

See Dianna Gunn, Most Shared Content Studied: The Post Formats That Get
Shared the Most on Social Media, REVIVE SOC.: SOC. MEDIA MKTG. (Jan. 29,
2020),
https://revive.social/most-shared-content/
[https://perma.cc/8DEVM5MG] (citing studies showing that videos receive 135% more reach on
Facebook than still photographs and that posts with photos get three times more
interaction from Facebook users than text alone).

264

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 23: 2

favorable picture.224 A federal judge asserted a similar concern in
the context of the arrests and harassment of journalists covering
demonstrations against police violence in Portland: “Without
journalists and legal observers, there is only the government’s side
of the story to explain why a ‘riot’ was declared and the public
streets were ‘closed’ and whether law enforcement acted properly in
effectuating that order.”225
Journalists should take precautions to secure their work product
against search and seizure since the incentives for police officers to
overstep their boundaries and make retaliatory arrests and/or destroy
footage are increasingly lopsided. Officers are heavily insulated
against civil liability for wrongful arrests—a product of the widely
reviled doctrine of “qualified immunity.”226 For example, in 2010,
the Third Circuit dismissed First Amendment claims against
Pennsylvania officers who arrested an automobile passenger on
wiretapping charges for videorecording the driver’s conversation
with police during a traffic stop.227 The court found that qualified
immunity shielded the officers against damages because, although
224
See West, supra note 61, at 311–12 (describing how, during the Trump
Administration, federal immigration authorities barred photojournalists and
videographers from detention centers at the Mexico border that were overcrowded
and unsanitary, instead distributing government-curated photos of detained
children cheerfully playing with toys and attending classes).
225
Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, 474 F. Supp. 3d 1113, 1123 (D.
Or. 2020).
226
See Lawrence Hurley & Andrew Chung, Before the Court: A United Front
Takes Aim at Qualified Immunity, REUTERS (May 8, 2020, 12:00 GMT),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunityopposition/ [https://perma.cc/Q485-ZHK9] (describing eclectic array of amici
from across the ideological spectrum urging the Supreme Court to narrow
qualified immunity, which enables government employees to escape liability for
violating the Constitution if there is no prior binding legal precedent involving
near-identical factual circumstances); see also Joanna C. Schwartz, Suing Police
for Abuse Is Nearly Impossible. The Supreme Court Can Fix That, WASH. POST:
POSTEVERYTHING (June 3, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/
2020/06/03/police-abuse-misconduct-supreme-court-immunity/
[https://perma.cc/Z428-S795] (decrying an “absurd” level of “hairsplitting” in
qualified immunity cases that enable police to get away with unjustified use of
force if no other officer has been successfully sued for factually identical
misconduct).
227
Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 251–52 (3d Cir. 2010).
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federal case law generally established a First Amendment right to
record police, none of the prior cases took place in the factually
identical context of a traffic stop.228 As one commentator observed,
while citizens theoretically have the right under the civil rights
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to seek damages against public employees
who commit constitutional violations, the remedy has proven only
minimally effective:
[I]t is unworkable for videographers because the burden for establishing
a municipality’s liability is too heavy, qualified immunity shields
offending officers, and courts do not provide adequate damages when
officers violate constitutional rights . . . . Although § 1983 was
promulgated to address citizens’ grievances for violations of their
constitutional rights, in the context of citizens filming police, it fails to
remedy anything, which results in no deterrence for police officers and
no protection for videographers.229

Holding officers accountable for ill-motivated arrests became
even more difficult with the Supreme Court’s 2019 ruling in Nieves
v. Bartlett,230 in which the Court found that police cannot be held
liable under the First Amendment for a speech-punitive arrest unless
the arrestee carries the burden of proving the absence of probable
cause.231 Just months after the Court decided Nieves, the Eighth
Circuit relied on the ruling to dismiss a First Amendment claim by
Tom Johnson, a former Minnesota Vikings football player, arising
out of a confrontation with police outside of a nightclub.232 Police
arrested Johnson for, inter alia, disorderly conduct and obstructing
legal process after he refused to stop filming an officer that Johnson

228

Id. at 262–63.
See Murphy, supra note 20, at 350.
230
Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S.Ct. 1715 (2019).
231
See id. at 1724–25; see also Michael G. Mills, The Death of Retaliatory
Arrest Claims: The Supreme Court’s Attempt to Kill Retaliatory Arrest Claims in
Nieves v. Bartlett, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 2059, 2078–79 (2020) (explaining that,
as a result of the heightened burden established in Nieves, claims of retaliatory
arrest in violation of the First Amendment are now superfluous because the same
lack of probable cause would also be required to establish a Fourth Amendment
claim of wrongful arrest).
232
Johnson v. McCarver, 942 F.3d 405, 409–11 (8th Cir. 2019).
229
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accused of manhandling him in the nightclub.233 A district court in
New York likewise relied on Nieves in dismissing First Amendment
claims by a photojournalist who was arrested for standing in the
street while covering protests against then-presidential-candidate
Donald Trump.234 Despite siding with the government, the judge
lamented that the facts smacked of selective enforcement and
“rais[ed] the specter of a police officer singling out a member of the
media in retaliation for his First Amendment activity.”235 Although
officers could be liable for damages if sued under the PPA, the
opportunity to destroy incriminating footage may seem worth the
risk for an officer who was caught on camera using excessive
force—an act that, in and of itself, might result in legal or career
jeopardy.236 Even recourse by way of a PPA lawsuit is increasingly
uncertain; at least one federal court has applied the Nieves standard
beyond its First Amendment context, holding that the existence of
“reasonably arguable” probable cause to make an arrest defeats a

233
Id. at 408. The former football player, Tom Johnson, who was tried on the
criminal charges and acquitted, was allowed to proceed on his Fourth Amendment
claim alleging excessive use of force because his evidence showed that an officer
slapped the smartphone out of his hand and then shocked him twice with a stungun although Johnson was sitting peacefully outside the nightclub. Id. at 411–12.
234
Nigro v. City of New York, No. 19-CV-2369, 2020 WL 5503539, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2020).
235
Id. at *7.
236
See, e.g., Fleming Smith, Columbia Police Officer Fired After Using Racial
Slur During Five Points Dispute, POST & COURIER (Aug. 21, 2020),
https://www.postandcourier.com/news/columbia-police-officer-fired-afterusing-racial-slur-during-five-points-dispute/article_e78717ec-ebe6-11ea-aef23b8d063937ee.html [https://perma.cc/NBY6-AGF9] (reporting that a South
Carolina police officer lost his job after he was caught on a bystander’s video
(posted to social media) using a racial slur toward bar patrons while clearing the
bar to comport with COVID-19 safety regulations); Minyvonne Burke, Georgia
Officer Fired After Video Shows Him Using Stun Gun on Woman During Arrest,
NBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/georgiaofficer-fired-after-video-shows-him-using-stun-gun-n1237773 [https://perma.cc/
6A6A-GSKV] (reporting that a suburban Atlanta police department fired an
officer caught on cellphone video, which went viral on the Tik Tok video
platform, cursing at a woman and shocking her with a stun-gun).
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journalist’s statutory claim for unlawful search and seizure under the
PPA as well.237
The disciplinary system for law enforcement provides no more
of a dependable check on police than the civil justice system.238
Officers generally escape punishment, even when caught using
force against unarmed civilians without apparent justification—as
was the case in the 2020 police killing of George Floyd that spurred
a national movement for racial justice and police accountability.239
Derek Chauvin, the Minneapolis officer convicted of murdering
Floyd, had accumulated at least eighteen previous citizen
complaints, including several complaints alleging the unjustified
use of force resembling his lethal interaction with George Floyd.240
Yet, Chauvin only twice received disciplinary consequences and
never lost his job or certification as a police officer.241 In recent
237
Am. News & Info. Serv., Inc. v. Gore, 778 F. App’x. 429, 431 (9th Cir.
2019) (unpublished).
238
See Rachel Moran, Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 837,
844 (2016) (characterizing police internal affairs processes as “an irresponsible
and, frankly, farcical method of responding to misconduct claims”).
239
Mollie Simon, Few Cops We Found Using Force on George Floyd
Protesters Are Known to Have Faced Discipline, PROPUBLICA (June 17, 2021),
https://www.propublica.org/article/few-cops-we-found-using-force-on-georgefloyd-protesters-are-known-to-have-faced-discipline [https://perma.cc/VW7NRHAF] (reporting results of a survey of dozens of law enforcement agencies that
showed, despite hundreds of documented instances of police tear-gassing or
otherwise using force to suppress nonviolent and nonthreatening protests during
2020, only 10 officers have been documented as facing any discipline).
240
See Jamiles Lartey & Abbie VanSickle, “That Could Have Been Me”: The
People Derek Chauvin Choked Before George Floyd, MARSHALL PROJ. (Feb. 2,
2021),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2021/02/02/that-could-have-beenme-the-people-derek-chauvin-choked-before-george-floyd
[https://perma.cc/UHL5-UFVL] (reporting that Chauvin was the subject of
twenty-two complaints or internal affairs investigations over his nineteen-year
career with the Minneapolis Police Department, including multiple complaints
lodged by people who—like George Floyd—were pinned to the ground in ways
that constricted their breathing).
241
See Dakin Andone, Hollie Silverman & Melissa Alonso, The Minneapolis
Police Officer Who Knelt on George Floyd’s Neck Had 18 Previous Complaints
Against Him, Police Department Says, CNN (May 29, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/us/minneapolis-officer-complaints-george-
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years, police so often have arrested, beaten, and gassed journalists
at protests (either indiscriminately lumping the journalists in with
demonstrators or selectively targeting the journalists simply for
being journalists) that news organizations have been forced to take
the extraordinary step of suing for injunctive relief against continued
abuses, doing so successfully in both Minneapolis242 and
Portland.243 Neither internal nor external checks appear especially
effective in preventing ill-disposed officers from misusing their
authority to suppress media coverage.
For all of these reasons, journalists recording scenes of civil
unrest—where confrontations between civilians and law
enforcement officers are foreseeable—cannot confidently assume
that police will respect their constitutional right to gather the news.
Accordingly, journalists should consider precautions to safeguard
their digital communications (for example, by logging out of social
media accounts or messaging apps not currently being used) on the
assumption that their smartphones might be seized. Both the Nieves
ruling and the statutory exceptions to the PPA provide incentives for
officers to look for ways to charge journalists with crimes. Anyone
floyd/index.html [https://perma.cc/6W2Y-L4ZW] (quoting Minneapolis police
authorities who said Chauvin had been named in eighteen prior complaints, only
two of which resulted in disciplinary action).
242
See Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, 338 F.R.D. 109 (D. Minn. 2021)
(entering a temporary restraining order against Minneapolis police accused of
shooting journalists with rubber bullets and disregarding an exemption for
newsgathering in the governor’s curfew order, which interfered with journalists’
ability to cover protests following George Floyd’s killing).
243
See Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, 480 F. Supp. 3d 1120 (D.
Or. 2020), aff’d, 977 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2020) (granting a preliminary injunction
against federal law enforcement agencies, enjoining arresting, searching, using
force against, or otherwise interfering with journalists and legal observers
lawfully conducting business at the scene of racial justice protests, after finding
that agents continued to intentionally target journalists in defiance of an earlier
temporary restraining order); see also Woodstock v. City of Portland, No. 3:20cv-1035, 2020 WL 3621179 (D. Or. July 2, 2020) (granting a similarly worded
temporary restraining order against city and state law enforcement personnel in
Portland, based on testimony that police repeatedly threatened journalists with
arrest if the journalists remained on scene of the demonstrations, did arrest three
journalists even after knowing they were members of the media, and shoved an
ACLU lawyer wearing conspicuous attire identifying her as a legal observer).
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planning to document and share images of protest would be welladvised to anticipate being arrested—or, at the very least,
confronted with a demand to surrender a smartphone—and take
measures to secure their work product against being searched,
seized, or destroyed.

